and, No. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov, cited above, § 81). The Court will therefore examine whether the other grounds referred to by the domestic courts were sufficient to justify the applicant's detention.
132. The judicial authorities relied, in addition to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, on specific facts relating to his behaviour. In particular, they found that he had continued his unlawful activities in breach of his undertaking not to reoffend and had attempted to intimidate his employees into not giving incriminating testimony. Indeed, several witnesses had requested, and were granted, anonymity because they had feared threats from the applicant, and one of them made written submissions to the remand court accusing the applicant of intimidation (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above). Moreover, the judicial authorities took into account the applicant's position as the director of the companies whose business activities were under investigation, a position which gave him an opportunity to destroy evidence. The Court is prepared to accept that the judicial authorities convincingly demonstrated the existence of a risk that, if released, the applicant might reoffend or interfere with the proceedings.
133. It remains to be ascertained whether that risk persisted throughout the entire period of detention. The Court notes in this respect that after a hypertensive attack in June 2007 the applicant became hemiplegic and bedridden. His restricted ability to move and, for some time, to speak, as well as the necessity for him to remain under constant medical supervision considerably reduced the danger of his absconding, reoffending, interfering with witnesses or destroying evidence. However, the domestic courts failed to take the changed circumstances into account and continued to extend the applicant's detention without any assessment of whether, considering the applicant's medical condition, that danger remained real. It is even more striking that after the applicant was brought to the courtroom on a stretcher accompanied by a doctor and a sign-language interpreter, since he could neither walk nor speak, the City Court found, without giving any reasons for that finding, that the risk of his fleeing from justice, reoffending or obstructing the proceedings still persisted (see paragraph 33 above). The Court is not persuaded by that finding. In its opinion, after June 2007 that risk was mitigated by the applicant's medical condition so that it was no longer sufficient to outweigh his right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
134. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that the authorities extended the applicant's detention on grounds which, although "relevant", cannot be regarded as "sufficient" for the entire period of detention. In these circumstances it will not be necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with "special diligence".
135. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
III. Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention
136. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 that his appeal against the detention order of 9 August 2007 had not been examined speedily. He further complained that, given that no hearings had been held between 7 November 2007 and 11 February 2008, he had not had an effective opportunity to lodge an application for release and have it examined by the court. Article 5 § 4 reads as follows:
"Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful."
A. Admissibility
1. Alleged impossibility of lodging
an application for release
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