ion of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the seriousness of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, Series A No. 207, § 51; see also Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral v. Poland, No. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov, cited above, § 81).
52. Another ground for the applicant's detention was his record of administrative offences. The Court accepts that that factor was relevant in assessing the danger of his reoffending. Such a danger, if convincingly established, may lead the judicial authorities to place and leave a suspect in detention in order to prevent any attempts to commit further offences. It is however necessary, among other conditions, that the danger be a plausible one and the measure appropriate, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in particular the past history and the personality of the person concerned (see Clooth v. Belgium, 12 December 1991, Series A No. 225, § 40). In the cases of Clooth v. Belgium and Kolev v. Bulgaria (see below) the Court found that the applicant's previous criminal record did not justify his detention because the offences which had given rise to his previous convictions were non-violent and were not comparable, either in nature or degree of seriousness, to the charges preferred against him in the contested proceedings (see Clooth, cited above, § 40, and Kolev v. Bulgaria, No. 50326/99, §§ 60 - 61, 28 April 2005). In the present case the applicant's record included only minor non-violent administrative offences and he had no criminal record. The Court considers that the applicant's record of administrative offences did not justify his continued detention (see, for similar reasoning, Aleksey Makarov v. Russia, No. 3223/07, § 51, 12 June 2008).
53. The domestic courts also referred to the fact that the offence in question had been committed by a group of people acting in criminal conspiracy. The Court observes that the fact that a person is charged with acting in criminal conspiracy is not in itself sufficient to justify long periods of detention; his personal circumstances and behaviour must always be taken into account (see Aleksey Makarov, cited above, § 50, and Popkov v. Russia, No. 32327/06, § 62, 15 May 2008). There is no indication in the present case that before his arrest the applicant had made any attempts to intimidate witnesses or to obstruct the course of the proceedings in any other way. In such circumstances the Court has difficulty accepting that there was a risk of interference with the administration of justice at the later stages of the proceedings. Such risk was bound to gradually decrease as the trial proceeded and the witnesses were interviewed (compare Miszkurka v. Poland, No. 39437/03, § 51, 4 May 2006) The Court is not therefore persuaded that compelling reasons existed for a fear that the applicant would interfere with witnesses or otherwise hamper the investigation of the case, and certainly not such as to outweigh his right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
54. The only other ground for the applicant's continued detention was the District Court's finding that he had no permanent place of residence or employment in Moscow. The applicant maintained that he had a permanent place of residence in the Moscow region. It is not necessary for the Court to determine the applicant's residence and employment situation. Even assuming that he did not have a permanent place of residence and was unemployed, the mere lack of a fixed residence or permanent employment does not give rise to a danger of absconding or reoffending (see Pshevecherskiy v. Russia, No. 28957/02, § 68, 24 May 2007). In the present case, the domestic courts did not point to any aspects of the applicant's chara
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