urt will examine this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Insofar as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations..., everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing... by [a]... tribunal..."
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.[...]"
11. The Government contested that argument. They argued that the supervisory review had been compatible with the Convention as the lower courts had erroneously interpreted and applied the substantive law provisions.
A. Admissibility
12. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
13. The Court reiterates that for the sake of legal certainty implicitly required by Article 6, final judgments should generally be left intact. They may be disturbed only to correct fundamental errors (see Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 51 - 52, ECHR 2003-IX). To answer this complaint the Court will hence have to determine if the grounds for the quashing of the applicant's judgment fell within this exception (see Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, § 29, 31 July 2008).
14. In the present case the final judgment was quashed solely on the grounds of the alleged misinterpretation of the substantive law.
15. The Court recalls that it has frequently found violations of the principle of legal certainty and of the right to a court in the supervisory-review proceedings governed by the former Code of Civil Procedure as it allowed final judgments in the applicants' favour to be set aside by higher courts following applications by state officials, whose power to make such applications was not subject to any time-limit (see, among other authorities, Ryabykh, cited above, §§ 51 - 56; Volkova v. Russia, No. 48758/99, §§ 34 - 36, 5 April 2005; Roseltrans v. Russia, No. 60974/00, §§ 27 - 28, 21 July 2005).
16. According to the Court's constant case-law, the fact that the Presidium disagreed with the interpretation of substantive law made by the lower courts was not, in itself, an exceptional circumstance warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January 2007).
17. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that in the present cases there were no circumstances justifying departure from the principle of legal certainty.
18. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6.
19. The Court further notes that the final judgment, though it did not indicate specific sums, unconditionally ordered the State to recalculate the pension payments which had been made earlier. The judgments thus created an asset within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Vasilopoulou v. Greece, No. 47541/99, § 22, 21 March 2002, and Malinovskiy v. Russia, No. 41302/02, § 43, ECHR 2005-VII (extracts)). The quashing of the judgment in breach of the principle of legal certainty frustrated the applicant's reliance on the binding judicial decision and deprived her of an opportunity to receive the judicial awards she had legitimately expected to receive (see Dovguchits v. Russia, No. 2999/03, § 35, 7 June 2007).
20. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
on account of non-e
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