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Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 23.07.2009 "Дело "Сутяжник (Sutyazhnik) против Российской Федерации" [рус., англ.]





> "It is unavoidable that in civil proceedings the parties would have conflicting views on application of the substantive law. ...The Court observes that before an application for supervisory review was lodged, the merits of the applicant's claim had been examined... by the first-instance and appeal courts. It has not been claimed that the courts acted outside their competences or that there was a fundamental defect in the proceedings before them. The fact that the Presidium disagreed with the assessment made by the first-instance and appeal courts was not, in itself, an exceptional circumstance warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim."
35. Thus, the Court accepts that in certain circumstances legal certainty can be disturbed in order to correct a "fundamental defect" or a "miscarriage of justice". However, these notions do not lend themselves to precise definition. The Court has to decide, in each case, to what extent the departure from the principle of legal certainty is justified (see, in the context of criminal proceedings, the case of Radchikov v. Russia, No. 65582/01, § 44, 24 May 2007; in the context of civil proceedings, see the cases of Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, §§ 31 et seq., 31 July 2008; and Tishkevich v. Russia, No. 2202/05, §§ 25 - 26, 4 December 2008).
36. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the reason for quashing the decisions of the lower courts was the fact that the dispute between the applicant association and the Department was outside the commercial courts' jurisdiction. The Court has already held that jurisdictional errors, in principle, may be regarded as a "fundamental defect" susceptible to correction by way of supervisory review (see Luchkina v. Russia, No. 3548/04, § 21, 10 April 2008). The question arises whether in the particular circumstances of the case the breach of the rules of jurisdiction may be considered as a "fundamental defect" calling for the review of the decision which the applicant considered to be res judicata.
37. The Court observes that, in Russia, disputes concerning the official registration of legal entities are, as a rule, examined by the commercial courts. Registration disputes involving public associations are, however, exempted from the jurisdiction of the commercial courts, seemingly because of the "non-economic" character of those disputes. That reading of the old Code was proposed by the Supreme Commercial Court, and the Court does not see any reason to disagree with it. However, it is noteworthy that both the applicant association and the defendant (the Department of Justice) considered that the commercial courts did have the power to decide on the case. Moreover, the commercial courts, at two levels of jurisdiction, accepted the case and examined it on the merits. That shows that the relevant provisions of the old Code, taken in conjunction with the Law On Public Associations, were ambiguous at best. The rules of jurisdiction were only clarified in 2002, in connection with the enactment of the new Code, when the Supreme Commercial Court specified that disputes concerning registration of non-profit organisations fall outside the competence of the commercial courts (see the "Relevant domestic Law" part above).
38. Thus, the Court is satisfied that the decision of 17 June 1999, as upheld on 18 October 1999 appeared to be lawful. The effects of the judgment of 17 June 1999 were very limited: it concerned only the parties involved in the proceedings, and did not conflict with any other judicial decision. The Court agrees that, as a matter of principle, the rules of jurisdiction should be respected. However, in the specific circumstances of the present case the Court does not detect any pressing social need which would justify the departure from the principle of legal certainty. The judgment was quashed primarily f



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