Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 18.06.2009 «Дело Штейн (Shteyn (Stein)) против России» [англ.]

ial. L and another person were at large while most of the charges apparently concerned defendants Z and L.
110. The Court therefore considers that, having failed to act diligently, the national authorities were not entitled to regard the circumstances of the case as justification for using the risk of collusion as a further ground for the applicant's detention.
(b) Risk of absconding
111. Throughout the period of detention the Russian courts also referred to the applicant's German nationality as a reason to believe that he might abscond, if released. The Court accepts that a detainee's foreign nationality could be a relevant factor in assessing the risk of flight (see Lind v. Russia, No. 25664/05, § 81, 6 December 2007). However, the danger of an accused absconding does not result just because it is possible or easy for him to cross the frontier: there must be a whole set of circumstances, such as, particularly, the lack of well-established ties in the country, which give reason to suppose that the consequences and hazards of flight will seem to him to be a lesser evil than continued imprisonment (see {Stogmuller} v. Austria, judgment of 10 November 1969, § 15, Series A No. 9). It was not disputed that the applicant's German passport had expired and was not renewed. The applicant, who was also a Russian national, could only cross the Russian border with his Russian travel passport (see Lind, cited above, §§ 53 and 81). It appears that after his arrest the applicant had been divested of his documents, including his passport. In any event, the domestic authorities did not explain why the withdrawal of his Russian travel passport did not mitigate the risk of his absconding abroad.
112. The Court is ready to accept that the applicant did not have a place of residence in Tomsk or elsewhere in Russia, which could be qualified as "permanent" by the Russian courts. However, the mere absence of a fixed residence does not give rise to a danger of absconding (see Pshevecherskiy v. Russia, No. 28957/02, § 68, 24 May 2007, and Sulaoja v. Estonia, No. 55939/00, § 64, 15 February 2005). As already stated, the risk of flight should be assessed with reference to various factors, especially those relating to the character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets, his family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted (see Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 10, Series A No. 8). Such risk necessarily decreases as the time spent in detention passes by for the probability that the length of detention on remand will be deducted from (or will count towards) the period of imprisonment which the person concerned may expect if convicted, is likely to make the prospect seem less awesome to him and reduce his temptation to flee (ibid.; see also paragraph 61 above).
113. In addition, the Court observes that the risk of absconding was the only reason cited by the remand judge on 20 November 2006. Even assuming that he intended to endorse the other reasons cited in previous detention orders, there was no serious attempt to establish that those reasons still obtained.
114. The Court therefore finds that the existence of the risk of absconding was not sufficiently established.
(c) Risk of reoffending
115. The domestic courts also mentioned that the applicant had previously been prosecuted for unlawfully dealing in firearms, had then been granted bail, but was "prosecuted again for even more serious offences" (see paragraph 24 above). The Court accepts that that fact may be relevant in assessing the danger of reoffending. Such a danger, if convincingly established, may lead the judicial authorities to place and leave a suspect in detention in order to prevent any attempts to commit further offences. It is however necessary, among other conditions, that the danger be a plausible one and the measu



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