y suspended and then resumed, which did not prove its ineffectiveness. The Government argued that the investigators' refusal to allow the applicants' access to the case file did not run counter to the procedural requirements of Article 2. Further, numerous investigative measures had been and were being taken and, accordingly, the investigation was compatible with the guarantees of Article 2 of the Convention.
2. The Court's assessment
98. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to "secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention", requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force, in particular by agents of the State. The investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see {Ogur} v. Turkey [GC], No. 21594/93, § 88, ECHR 1999-III). In particular, there is an implicit requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition (see {Yasa} v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, §§ 102 - 04, Reports 1998-VI, and Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, No. 22535/93, ECHR 2000-III, §§ 106 - 07). It must be accepted that there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation. However, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating the use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their maintenance of the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. For the same reasons, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all cases, however, the next of kin of the victim must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests (see Shanaghan v. the United Kingdom, No. 37715/97, §§ 91 - 92, 4 May 2001).
99. In the instant case, the Court observes that an investigation into the killing of the applicants' relatives was instituted on 8 September 2002 and remains ongoing to date. It must assess whether that investigation met the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention.
100. The Court notes at the outset that the majority of the documents from the investigation were not disclosed by the Government. It therefore has to assess the effectiveness of the investigation on the basis of the few documents submitted by the parties and the sparse information on its progress presented by the Government.
101. The Court observes that the investigation was commenced on the day after the attack. It also appears from the decision of 10 September 2002 that during the first two days of the investigation the district prosecutor's office questioned witnesses and took some investigative steps that allowed them to reach a conclusion concerning military involvement in the killings (see paragraph 44 above). However, after the case file had been transferred to a military prosecutor's office, the investigation appears to have become protracted and plagued with inexplicable shortcomings and delays.
102. In particular, despite the abundant evidence of the federal military personnel's involvement in the attack of 7 September 2002 and the killing of the applicants' three relatives, it is clear that by 28 December 2005 no meaningful efforts had been made to establish the identity of the State agents who had given the order to fire artillery shells at the populous village, or of those who had carried out the order (see paragraph
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