0 March 2005 did not entail any serious consequences for the applicant: the applications for release were submitted right after the examination of the appeals against the extension orders and contained no new arguments. The Government concluded that although there had been a breach of the formal requirements of the domestic law as regards the time-limits for the examination of the applicant's appeals, this had not amounted to a violation of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
150. The applicant submitted that the absence in the domestic law of any time-limits for sending the case to the appeal court substantially delayed the examination of his appeals. Despite his requests, he had never been granted leave to appear before the appeal court. The "objective reasons" for the delays referred to by the Government were indicative of lack of proper organisation on the part of the domestic court.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
151. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
152. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4, in guaranteeing to persons arrested or detained the right to take proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of the detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful. Although it does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention, a State which institutes such a system must in principle accord to the detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see Navarra v. France, judgment of 23 November 1993, § 28, Series A No. 273-B, and Toth v. Austria, 12 December 1991, § 84, Series A No. 224). The requirement that a decision be given "speedily" is undeniably one such guarantee. In that context, the Court also observes that there is a special need for a swift decision determining the lawfulness of detention in cases where a trial is pending because the defendant should benefit fully from the principle of the presumption of innocence (see {Ilowiecki} v. Poland, No. 27504/95, § 76, 4 October 2001).
153. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes, first of all, that the examination of the applicant's appeals against the decisions of 17 February, 21 June, 25 December 2003 and 2 February and 5 February 2004 refusing his release and his appeal against the extension order of 19 February 2004 was discontinued by the Supreme Court on 10 March 2005 on the ground that the applicant had in the meantime been convicted (see paragraphs 26 and 28 above). The Court reiterates that it has already concluded that there was a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention against the background of comparable factual circumstances in the case of Nakhmanovich (cited above), finding as follows:
"84. In the present case the applicant's complaint about the unlawfulness of his detention was not examined on the ground that the criminal case against him had been submitted for trial in the meantime... The District Court expressly refused to rule on whether the applicant's detention during that period had been lawful. It follows that the applicant was denied the right to a judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of his detention pending trial. Moreover, the Court observes that no such ground for discontinuing proceedings concerning the lawfulness of detention pending trial was provided for in domestic law."
154. As regards the examination of the applicant's complaints against the extension orders of 1 July, 1 Octobe
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