antive law has been erroneously applied or interpreted."
THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on account of the quashing
of the judgment in the applicant's favour
11. The applicant complained that the quashing of the judgment of 25 July 2003 by way of supervisory-review proceedings had violated her "right to a court" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and her right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations..., everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a]... tribunal..."
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law..."
A. Submissions by the parties
12. The Government, relying on the Court's judgments in the cases of Pellegrin v. France ([GC], No. 28541/95, ECHR 1999-VIII) and Kanayev v. Russia (No. 43726/02, 27 July 2006), argued that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 of the Convention was incompatible ratione materiae because the applicant was a military officer and the judgment award had concerned allowances for her military service. They further argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was also inapplicable because the applicant had not had a "possession" within the meaning of that Convention provision as she had had no right to receive "payments in the amount claimed". She had neither an "existing possession" nor a "legitimate expectation". As to the merits of the complaint, the Government noted that the judgment of 25 July 2003 had been quashed because the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison had incorrectly interpreted and applied substantive law.
13. The applicant averred that the quashing of the final judgment of 25 July 2003 had irremediably impaired the principle of legal certainty and deprived her of the right to receive money she was entitled to receive.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
(a) Admissibility
14. The Government contested the applicability of Article 6 to the dispute raised by the applicant. Relying on Pellegrin (cited above), they argued that Article 6 was not applicable since complaints raised by servants of the State such as military officers over their conditions of service were excluded from its ambit.
15. The Court accepts that in the Pellegrin judgment it attempted to establish an autonomous interpretation of the term "civil service". To that end the Court introduced a functional criterion based on the nature of the employee's duties and responsibilities.
16. However, in its judgment in the case of Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland ([GC], No. 63235/00, 19 April 2007), the Court found that the functional criterion adopted in the Pellegrin judgment did not simplify the analysis of the applicability of Article 6 in proceedings to which a civil servant was a party or bring about a greater degree of certainty in this area as intended (§ 55). For these reasons the Court decided to further develop the functional criterion set out in Pellegrin and adopted the following approach:
"To recapitulate, in order for the respondent State to be able to rely before the Court on the applicant's status as a civil servant in excluding the protection embodied in Article 6, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a
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