ant should have waited for completion of the investigation before filing his complaint with the Court, as the conclusion of those proceedings would not remedy their overall delay in any way (see Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, No. 55523/00, § 103, ECHR 2007-...).
117. In the light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Government's preliminary objections and finds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 under its procedural limb.
(b) Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant
118. As the Court has stated on many occasions, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 120, ECHR 2000-IV). Treatment has been held by the Court to be "inhuman" because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and also "degrading" because it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. The question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a further factor to be taken into account, but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 24888/94, § 71, ECHR 1999-IX).
119. In the context of detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, No. 4353/03, § 73, ECHR 2006-...; Sarban v. Moldova, No. 3456/05, § 77, 4 October 2005; and Mouisel v. France, No. 67263/01, § 40, ECHR 2002-IX). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Sheydayev v. Russia, No. 65859/01, § 59, 7 December 2006; Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 38, Series A No. 336; and Krastanov v. Bulgaria, No. 50222/99, § 53, 30 September 2004).
120. The Court further reiterates that allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 161, Series A No. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. Where an individual is taken into custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a plausible and convincing explanation of how those injuries were caused (see Salman, cited above, § 100, and Ribitsch, cited above, § 34).
121. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that on th
> 1 2 3 ... 12 13 14 ... 24 25 26