e detainee they convoyed. Further incoherence may be observed in the account of the applicant's return into custody later that evening. In particular, it remains unexplained why D., having received an "anonymous call" inviting him to collect the applicant at the designated address, did not seek assistance from his fellow policemen in arresting the kidnappers, but simply picked the applicant up and took him back to the detention facility.
40. The Court, however, does not need to resolve doubts as to the extent of D., T. and K.'s involvement in the applicant's abduction for the following reasons.
41. The Court notes that the existence of professional negligence on the part of these officials had been confirmed in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 18 above). It furthermore considers, contrary to what the Government claimed, that the omissions on the part of the impugned officers had a direct causal link with the applicant's injuries. Even assuming that the convoy fell an innocent victim of the "unidentified perpetrators", as they contended, their professional duty required them to do everything possible to rescue the inmate in their charge. However, as mentioned above, they neither pursued the kidnappers nor reported the assault, having thus failed to take even the most obvious steps to prevent the kidnappers from taking the applicant away and ill-treating him. The Court therefore considers that even the "professional negligence" in transporting him, which has been acknowledged by the authorities, was a major contributor to the damage suffered by the applicant. For this reason, without having to examine whether the officials' involvement in the abduction went further than mere negligence, the Court considers it established that there has been a failure to ensure the applicant's security and that there has been a causal link between the authorities' conduct and the applicant's ill-treatment.
42. The Court therefore considers that the Russian authorities failed to rebut the presumption of their responsibility for the injuries inflicted on the applicant while in charge of the State. Accordingly, the responsibility for the ill-treatment lies with the domestic authorities.
43. The Court shall further determine the form of ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant. In determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of this distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, § 167). The fact that pain or suffering was inflicted with an intention to obtain information, inflict punishment or intimidate is a factor to be taken into account in deciding whether ill-treatment amounted to torture (see Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, § 64, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; {Aydin} v. Turkey, 25 September 1997, §§ 83 - 84 and 86, Reports 1997-VI; Selmouni v. France [GC], No. 25803/94, § 105, ECHR 1999-V; Dikme v. Turkey, No. 20869/92, §§ 94 - 96, ECHR 2000-VIII; Salman, cited above, § 114; and {Bati} and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 116, ECHR 2004-IV (extracts)).
44. The Court finds that in the instant case the existence of physical pain and suffering is attested by the medical report and the applicant's statements regarding his ill-treatment at the hands of the kidnappers. The nature of injuries and the account of events indicate that the pain and suffering was inflicted on him intentionally, in particular with the view of extracting from him a confession to having committed the offence he was suspected of and of taking revenge on him.
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