date of enforcement. Thus, the award in favour of Mrs Gurova had remained without execution for more than 7 years and 4 months. As regards the judgment in favour of Mrs Sadchikova (case No. 13570/06), nothing suggests that the applicant had received the payment allegedly made to her on 3 July 2007. The Court accordingly considers that the judgment in her favour has not been enforced to date, and the delay in execution has exceeded seven years and nine months. As regards the remaining applications, the Court notes that the delay in enforcement of the judgment in favour of Mrs Kazmina (case No. 746/05) had lasted for 5 years and 15 days, in favour of Mrs Sedykh (case No. 13574/06) for 5 years and 5 days and in favour of Mrs Pisareva and Mr Pisarev (case No. 13579/06) for 4 years and 11 months and 4 years, 9 months and 30 days, respectively.
32. The Court notes the Government's argument that the delays in enforcement for which the authorities were responsible should run from the date when the applicants had submitted the enforcement papers to the correct authority. However, the Court reiterates that where a judgment is against the State, the State must take the initiative to enforce it (see Akashev v. Russia, No. 30616/05, § 21 - 23, 12 June 2008). As regards the argument advanced by the Government in case No. 13570/06 that Mrs Sadchikova evaded receipt of the judgment debt, the Court notes, first, that this allegation was not substantiated by any evidence or any further details and, second, in any event the authorities had not taken any initiative to execute the award of 16 February 2001 until at least the end of 2005. Such a delay is incompatible with the Convention requirements.
33. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that delays in enforcement of the judgments in the applicants' favour were unreasonable, impaired the applicants' right to a court and prevented them from receiving the money they had legitimately expected to receive. The Court considers that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the present five cases.
III. Observance of Article 34 of the Convention
34. In their observations Mrs Sadchikova, Mrs Sedykh and Mrs Gurova complained, without further detail, that the prosecutor's office summoned them for interviews in a manner incompatible with Article 34 of the Convention. They referred to the fact that the respective summonses contained an indication that a failure to comply with the prosecutor's order might have given rise to an administrative sanction. Article 34, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
"The Court may receive applications from any person, ...claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."
35. The Court recalls that the issue of whether or not contacts between the authorities and an applicant amount to unacceptable practices from the standpoint of Article 34 must be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. In the context of the questioning of applicants about their applications under the Convention by authorities exercising a domestic investigative function, this will depend on whether the procedures adopted have involved a form of illicit and unacceptable pressure which may be regarded as hindering the exercise of the right of individual application. "Pressure" includes not only direct coercion but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage applicants from pursuing a Convention remedy. (see, for example, {Aydin} v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI, pp. 1899 - 1900, §§ 115 - 117; and Salman v. Turkey [GC], No. 21
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