tablishment of the facts
A. The parties' arguments
57. The applicants claimed that Aslanbek Khamzayev had been arrested on 25 June 2002 and that the date of 25 July 2002 had been mentioned in the statements by the first applicant and Ms E. by mistake. They further pointed out that in all other respects different witnesses had given a consistent account of the events. In their submission, it was beyond reasonable doubt that the men who had taken away Aslanbek Khamzayev were State agents. In support of their complaint they noted that Russian servicemen had carried out a special "sweeping" operation on the day of the disappearance; Aslanbek Khamzayev had been subjected to an identity check shortly before his disappearance; and an APC could only be used by federal troops.
58. The Government submitted that unidentified armed men had kidnapped Aslanbek Khamzayev. They further pointed out that the applicants were not sure of the exact date of the disappearance. According to the Government, the crime was committed on 25 June 2002. The information related by Ms E. to the applicants and investigators was not coherent. The applicants and their relatives had not given a consistent and corroborated account of the circumstances of their relative's kidnapping. The Government submitted that the investigation of the incident was pending, that there was no evidence that the men had been State agents and that there were therefore no grounds for holding the State liable for the alleged violations of the applicants' rights. They further argued that there was no convincing evidence that the applicants' relative was dead.
B. The Court's evaluation of the facts
59. In cases where there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted when establishing the facts with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court. When, as in the instant case, the respondent Government have exclusive access to information able to corroborate or refute the applicants' allegations, any lack of cooperation by the Government without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant's allegations (see {Tanis} and Others v. Turkey, No. 65899/01, § 160, ECHR 2005-...).
60. The Court points out that a number of principles have been developed in its case-law as regards cases where it is faced with the task of establishing facts on which the parties disagree. As to the facts that are in dispute, the Court reiterates its jurisprudence requiring the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt" in its assessment of evidence (see {Avsar} v. Turkey, No. 25657/94, § 282, ECHR 2001-VII (extracts)). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. In this context, the conduct of the parties when evidence is being obtained has to be taken into account (see {Tanis} and Others, cited above, § 160).
61. The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 28883/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 32, Series A No. 336; and {Avsar}, cited above, § 283) even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place.
62. The Court reiterates that it has noted the difficulties for applicants to obtain the necessary evidence in support of allegations in cases where the respondent Government are in posse
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