Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 08.01.2009 «Дело Рыпакова (Rypakova) против России» [англ.]

/> 25. The Government contested that argument.
26. The proceedings concerning the applicant's title to the garage lasted from 30 January 1995 to 16 April 2004, i.e. nine years, two months and eighteen days. The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 5 May 1998, when the Convention came into force in respect of Russia. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time which by that time had been pending for over three years.
27. The Court observes that in the present case, at least five years, eleven months and thirteen days fall within the Court's competence ratione temporis.
28. Furthermore, the period of fourteen months between 15 February 2002, when a seemingly final domestic decision was delivered, and 9 April 2003, when it was quashed under supervisory review, had to be excluded (see Markin v. Russia (dec.), No. 59502/00, 16 September 2004). The remaining period to be assessed is four years six months and twenty three days.

A. Admissibility

29. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B. Merits

30. The Court observes that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
31. The Court considers that the case was not particularly difficult to determine.
32. As to the applicant's conduct, the Government argued that the applicant had contributed to the delay in the proceedings by submitting additional claims and by her occasional failure to appear for the hearings.
33. In respect of the argument concerning additional claims, the Court observes that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in the defence of his interest (see, mutatis mutandis, {Yagci} and {Sargin} v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A No. 319-A). As to the applicant's absences, the Court notes that the parties disagreed on factual matters concerning the applicant's attendance of the hearings on 24 December 1998 and on 1 September 2000. In the Court's opinion, even assuming that the applicant had failed to appear on these two occasions, her conduct could not have contributed notably to the length of the proceedings.
34. The Court observes, on the other hand, that substantial periods of inactivity, for which the Government have not submitted any satisfactory explanation, are attributable to the domestic authorities. After 8 June 1998, for instance, when the judgment was quashed on appeal, the hearings were adjourned three times due to the defendant's failure to appear. The next examination did not take place until 16 February 2000, i.e. one year, eight months and ten days after that date. After the next quashing of the judgment on appeal on 17 April 2000 the hearings were adjourned six times due to the defendant' failure to appear. The next examination did not take place until 15 February 2002. During this time the court adjourned the hearing on two occasions in order to obtain additional evidence.
35. The Court notes that the conduct of the defendant was one of the reasons for the prolongation of the proceedings. In the Court's opinion, the domestic authorities failed to take adequate steps in order to ensure its attendance. During the procee



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