coup {d'etat} Turkey intervened to ensure the protection of the Republic of Cyprus under the terms of a Treaty of Guarantee previously concluded between three interested States (Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece) which gave these States the right to intervene separately or jointly when the situation so required, and the situation did so require ultimately in July 1974, on account of the coup {d'etat}. In all of the above, incidentally, I make no mention of the bloody events and incidents which had been going on continually since 1963.
This implementation of a clause in the Treaty of Guarantee changed the previously existing political situation and durably established the separation of the two communities which had been in evidence as early as 1963.
I fully agree with Judge Bernhardt that after the 1974 coup {d'etat} there were a number of actors and factors involved in the Cypriot "drama", including "the population transfer from north to south and south to north". He continued: "The result of the different influences and events is the "iron wall" which has existed now for more than two decades and which is supervised by United Nations forces. All negotiations or proposals for negotiations aimed at the unification of Cyprus have failed up to now. Who is responsible for this failure? Only one side? Is it possible to give a clear answer to this and several other questions and to draw a clear legal conclusion? ... The case of Mrs Loizidou is not the consequence of an individual act of Turkish troops directed against her property or her freedom of movement, but it is the consequence of the establishment of the borderline in 1974 and its closure up to the present day."
After the establishment of the buffer-zone under the control of United Nations forces, movement from north to south and vice versa was prohibited and there was a population exchange with the common consent of the Turkish and Cypriot authorities under which eighty thousand Turkish Cypriots moved from southern to northern Cyprus.
I must emphasise once again that, as already mentioned at the very beginning of this dissenting opinion, in the present case we are dealing with a political situation and it is impossible to separate the political aspects of the case from the legal aspects.
The case has another political dimension for our Court. Its judgment will certainly have consequences for future cases - whose origins go back to the Second World War - against new members of the Council of Europe, such as the countries in central or eastern Europe previously governed by communist regimes.
Turkey has recognised the Court's jurisdiction only in respect of events subsequent to 22 January 1990. That restriction excludes all judicial consideration of events prior to that date, even if they were incompatible with the respondent State's obligations under the Convention.
The Convention institutions have accepted the notion of "continuing violations", that is violations which began before the critical date and continued afterwards. However, where this concept is invoked it is vital to define its scope and its limits. In the case of imprisonment or the illegal occupation of land before and after the date concerned there is no doubt that a continuing violation exists and that the period subsequent to the critical date falls within the Court's jurisdiction. Like Judge Bernhardt, however, I consider that the position is different in the present case, where a certain historical event has led to "a situation such as the closing of a border with automatic consequences in a great number of cases". If it were otherwise, the Strasbourg institutions could be confronted with the difficult task of reconsidering historical events many years after their occurrence and applying Convention standards retrospectively.
In the Loizidou v. Turkey case it is the existence of a buffer-zone, a kind of border guarded by UN f
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