t its judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 154, Series A No. 25; Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, § 86, Series A No. 39; and Karner v. Austria, No. 40016/98, § 26, ECHR 2003-IX). Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of the Convention States (see Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, No. 25965/04, § 197, 7 January 2010; Karner, cited above, § 26; and Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, No. 49429/99, §§ 78 to 79, ECHR 2005-XII (extracts)).
40. The Court takes note of the measures taken by the national authorities to redress the applicant's individual situation, in particular by issuing an order allowing him, on an exceptional basis, to make use of parental leave (see paragraph 16 above). At the same time, it observes that the Military Service Act and the Regulations on military service, which served as the legal basis for the repeated refusals to grant the applicant parental leave, remain in force. By virtue of that legislation a large group of people (male military personnel) continue to be denied an entitlement to parental leave. The Court considers that the subject matter of the present application - the alleged discrimination under Russian law against male military personnel as regards entitlement to parental leave - involves an important question of general interest which has not yet been examined by the Court. Further examination of the present application would therefore contribute to elucidating, safeguarding and developing the standards of protection under the Convention. Accordingly, the Court does not find it appropriate to strike the application out of its list of cases. It considers that there are special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the further examination of the application on its merits. Accordingly, it rejects the Government's request for the application to be struck out under Article 37 § 1 of the Convention.
(c) Conclusion
41. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) General principles
42. As the Court has consistently held, Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded thereby. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous - there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of them (see, among many other authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, § 33, Reports 1997-I, and Petrovic v. Austria, 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports 1998-II).
43. The Court has also held that not every difference in treatment will amount to a violation of Article 14. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that this distinction is discriminatory (see {Unal} Tekeli v. Turkey, No. 29865/96, § 49, ECHR 2004-X (extracts)). A difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justificati
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