on; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 65731/01, § 51, ECHR 2006-VI).
44. The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a difference in treatment (see Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, § 42, Reports 1996-IV). The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and its background (see Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 November 1984, § 40, Series A No. 87, and Inze v. Austria, 28 October 1987, § 41, Series A No. 126), but the final decision as to observance of the Convention's requirements rests with the Court. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must however have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved (see Weller v. Hungary, No. 44399/05, § 28, 31 March 2009; Stec and Others, cited above, §§ 63 and 64; {Unal} Tekeli, cited above, § 54; and, mutatis mutandis, Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 46295/99, § 68, ECHR 2002-IV).
(b) Application of these principles to the present case
45. It was not disputed between the parties that the applicant could rely on Article 14 of the Convention. The Court reiterates in this connection that, by enabling one of the parents to stay at home to look after the children, parental leave and related allowances promote family life and necessarily affect the way in which it is organised. Parental leave and parental allowances therefore come within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention. It follows that Article 14, taken together with Article 8, is applicable. Accordingly, although Article 8 does not include a right to parental leave or impose any positive obligation on States to provide parental leave allowances, if a State does decide to create a parental leave scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with Article 14 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Petrovic, cited above, §§ 26 to 29).
46. The Court observes that the applicant, being a serviceman, had no statutory right to parental leave. It is undisputed that civilians, both men and women, as well as servicewomen, are entitled to parental leave. The denial of parental leave to the applicant was accordingly based on a combination of two grounds: military status plus sex. The Court has to examine whether, in relation to parental leave, the difference in treatment between parents depending on their military or civilian status and on their sex is acceptable under Article 14.
47. The Court will first examine whether there is an objective and reasonable justification for the difference in treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to parental leave. It reiterates that the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe and very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before such a difference of treatment could be regarded as compatible with the Convention (see Burghartz v. Switzerland, 22 February 1994, § 27, Series A No. 280-B, and Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 67, Series A No. 263).
48. The Court is not convinced by the Constitutional Court's argument that, as far as parental leave is concerned, the different treatment of male and female military personnel is justified by the special social role of mothers in the upbringing of children (see paragraph 19 above). It observes that in contrast to maternity leave and associated allowances, which are primarily intended to enable the mother to recover from the fatigue of childbirth and to breastfeed her baby
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