ved in the course of the domestic investigation into his kidnapping.
99. The witnesses questioned had not seen exactly how the applicant had been kidnapped. Mr L. had not informed the domestic investigation that the area in the vicinity of his home had been surrounded by twenty-five or thirty men in civilian clothes. The policemen, Mr T. and Mr S., had stated to the investigators that they had not arrested anyone on the night of 15 April 2005 and had not seen any men surrounding the building at 14 Sovetskaya Street.
100. The applicant had refused to study the decision to grant him victim status and to be questioned as a victim.
101. The Government commented on the letter from the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a copy of which had been submitted by the applicant's representative, that its contents "[had] not correspond[ed] to the facts". They also argued that the copy submitted was barely legible. They were later provided with other copies but made no further comments on the document.
102. In sum, the Government asserted that the applicant's kidnapping had not been imputable to the State authorities.
2. The applicant
103. The applicant claimed that his allegation of State involvement in his transfer to Tajikistan had been proved by the following. The applicant had arrived in Tajikistan without a passport, which would be impossible unless he had been accompanied by State agents. The Tajik authorities had publicly confirmed that he had been extradited via official channels. Mr L.'s statements before the Russian investigators and the Court had not been contradictory.
104. The applicant had indeed been unwilling to be questioned by the Tajik investigators in relation to criminal case No. 27807; however, he had requested the Russian investigators to question him in Russian territory.
B. The Court's assessment
105. Given that the parties are in strong disagreement in their respective accounts of the circumstances of the present case, it is necessary for the Court to establish the facts concerning the applicant's transfer to Tajikistan.
106. The Court notes at the outset that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 28883/95, 4 April 2000, and Altun v. Turkey, No. 24561/94, § 42, 1 June 2004). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Mathew v. the Netherlands, No. 24919/03, § 155, ECHR 2005-IX).
107. The Court further reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it applies the standard of proof "beyond reasonable doubt". However, in the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties' submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake (see, with further references, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], Nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005-VII).
108. The Court has also re
> 1 2 3 ... 10 11 12 ... 17 18 19