t two levels of jurisdiction and once at one level of jurisdiction, with an insignificant interval in April 2002. The examination of the case thus lasted ten years and one month.
A. Admissibility
44. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
45. The Government disagreed with the complaint. In particular, they argued that the applicant's case had been complex involving four-way real estate transactions, four case files and over fifteen parties at various points in the proceedings. They further suggested that the location of some of the disputed housing outside the area of the court's competence and particularly a special situation in the Chechen Republic where one of the houses had been located had made examination of the case even more difficult. As to the conduct of the authorities, the Government stated that the domestic courts had not displayed any negligence or procrastination and had undertaken all available measures to speed up the proceedings. As to the applicant's conduct, they provided a list of all procedural motions made by the parties as well as reasons of the adjournment decisions.
46. The applicant maintained her complaint. In particular, she argued that staying of the proceedings due to Kh.'s unknown whereabouts had not been provided for in the domestic law.
47. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], No. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
48. The Court accepts that the case at question bore a certain degree of complexity, having concerned a set of four-way real estate exchange transactions and involved numerous parties. However, it cannot accept that the complexity of the case, taken on its own, was such as to justify the overall length of the proceedings (see, among others, Antonov v. Russia (dec.), No. 38020/03, 3 November 2005).
49. Insofar as the parties' conduct is concerned, the Court deems it best to examine separately the period preceding the decision of 23 October 2002 to stay the proceedings and the period following it.
50. In respect of the first period the Court firstly notes that by 5 May 1998, the date of entry into force of the Convention in respect of Russia, the applicant's case had been pending for one year and two months after its remittal to the first instance by way of supervisory review (see paragraph 10 above). After 5 May 1998 the proceedings continued for four years and five months, during which the domestic courts examined the case twice at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court is satisfied that during this period the domestic courts scheduled hearings regularly and did not exhibit any particular negligence. With regard to the applicant's behaviour, even though she delayed the proceedings to some extent by failing to appear in a few hearings together with some other parties, the resulting delays were insignificant. Overall, taking into account the complexity of the case the Court accepts that there was no breach of the "reasonable requirement" during this period.
51. With regard to the second period, the Court observes that it lasted from 23 October 2002 to 16 June 2008 for consideration of the case at one level of jurisdiction. The Court is particularly mindful of a lapse of five years and eight months that occurred after the decision to stay the proceedings and that contribut
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