ed most to the overall length. The Court is thus called to analyse whether this delay was justified and whether any of the parties bear a particular responsibility for it.
52. The Court recalls that on 23 October 2002 the trial court examining the applicant's case decided to stay the proceedings due to the lack of knowledge about a respondent's whereabouts (see paragraph 30 above). This decision was taken in response to a motion by one of the parties objecting to the examination of the case in the respondent's absence. Its reasoning took into account the fact that the case was complex and could not be resolved in absence of that particular respondent who, in addition, could not have been properly notified of the hearings due to the lack of knowledge about his whereabouts. The Court takes cognisance of the applicant's argument that the decision did not have a ground in the national law. Nevertheless, the decision which attempted to balance speedy administration of justice with the interests of the parties and fair consideration of the case does not appear to be arbitrary.
53. The Court observes that with the entry into force of the new code of civil procedure in 1 February 2003 and, consequently, introduction of the provision on appointment of legal counsel to represent a missing respondent, the applicant and the trial court were given the equal possibility of initiating the resumption of the proceedings.
54. The Court reiterates that, according to its previous findings, the responsibilities of the applicant in civil cases are "to show diligence in carrying out the procedural steps relevant to him...and to avail himself of the scope afforded by domestic law for shortening proceedings" ({Union} Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain, 7 July 1989, § 35, Series A No. 157). It further reiterates that it is incumbent on the interested party to display special diligence in the defence of his interests (see Sutyazhnik v. Russia (dec.), No. 8269/02, 2 March 2006).
55. Turning to the present case, it observes that during more than five years the applicant did not make any effort to initiate resumption of the proceedings which were stayed by the court upon a motion made by one of the parties. Nor did she attempt any other course of action. A contrario to the case of {Union} Alimentaria Sanders S.A. cited above, in the present application a request by the applicant to resume the proceedings could not have been deemed extraordinary and such a request would have been necessarily examined by the court. The Court is not in possession of any explanation from the applicant as to why she abstained from taking advantage of the available procedural remedy, or any other course of action, for more than five years. In this situation the Court cannot attribute the responsibility for the delay at issue solely to the authorities.
56. In view of these special circumstances, notwithstanding the overall length of the proceedings in the applicant's case, the Court considers that the authorities cannot be found responsible.
57. There has accordingly been no violation of the Convention.
II. Other alleged violations of the Convention
58. The applicant also complained under Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention of unlawfulness of the judgment of 26 December 1994 and under Article 6 of unfairness of the proceedings concerning payment of a guardian's allowance that ended on 25 December 2002.
59. The Court considers that the first complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
60. As to the second complaint, it was introduced outside of the period of six months after adoption of the final decision and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSL
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