nal judgments in the applicants' favour was called into question could have been avoided, had the military commissariat lodged an ordinary appeal within the statutory ten-day time-limit (see Borshchevskiy v. Russia, No. 14853/03, § 48, 21 September 2006, and Nelyubin v. Russia, No. 14502/04, § 27, 2 November 2006). The Government did not point to any exceptional circumstances that would have prevented the military commissariat from making use of an ordinary appeal in good time (see, in identical context, Zvezdin v. Russia, No. 25448/06, §§ 30 - 32, 14 June 2007, and Murtazin, cited above, §§ 27 - 29). Furthermore, it appears that in several cases the regional commissariat had timeously appealed against the judgments, but then revoked the grounds of appeal. Moreover, the Court notes that the military commissariat had failed to apply for an extension of the time-limit for lodging of the ordinary appeal against the judgments, but chose to make use of the extraordinary remedy, such as the supervisory review.
54. Third, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the applications for the supervisory review of more than thirty domestic judgments had been introduced by the respondent authority outside the one-year time-limit set out in the domestic law (see paragraph 19 above). No justification for that had been advanced by the Government. It is true that the domestic courts granted the extension of the respective time-limit on the ground that the respondent commissariat had not been timeously informed of the proceedings against it. Being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, the Court nevertheless is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and may depart from them where this is rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for instance, Novikov v. Russia, No. 35989/02, § 38, June 2009, and Khamidov v. Russia, No. 72118/01, § 135 et seq., ECHR 2007-XIII (extracts)). The Court notes, in particular, the Government's observation that in September - October 2004 thirty-three applicants had submitted the writs of execution directly to the respondent authority, and the latter had received them. It also notes, and it is uncontested between the parties, that the authority attempted to appeal against several first instance judgments, but then revoked the respective applications without referring to a specific reason. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that the respondent authority was genuinely unaware of the proceedings before the first instance court (see, by contrast, Podrugina and Yedinov v. Russia (dec.), No. 39654/07, 17 February 2009).
55. In view of the above, the Court is not satisfied that a fair balance between the interests of the applicants and the need to ensure the proper administration of justice was ensured. The Court agrees that, as a matter of principle, the rules of jurisdiction should be respected. However, in the specific circumstances of the present eighty-seven cases the Court does not detect a specific reason which would justify the departure from the principle of legal certainty (see, mutatis mutandis, Sutyazhnik v. Russia, No. 8269/02, § 39, 23 July 2009), in particular, given that the respondent authority did not make use of the ordinary remedy in due time.
56. The Court finds that, by granting the military commissariat's request to set aside the final domestic judgments in the applicants' favour listed in Parts A and B of Annex I, the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court infringed the principle of legal certainty and the applicants' "right to a court" under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a violation of that Article in the eighty-seven cases at hand.
ii. Supervisory review: procedural issues
57. With regard to the complaint about the procedural defects of the hearing before the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court, the Court finds that, having concluded
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