tes that the quashing by way of supervisory review of a judicial decision which has become final and binding may render the litigant's right to a court illusory and infringe the principle of legal certainty (see, among many other authorities, {Brumarescu} v. Romania [GC], No. 28342/95, § 62, ECHR 1999-VII; Ryabykh v. Russia, No. 52854/99, §§ 56 - 58, 24 July 2003). In certain circumstances legal certainty can be disturbed in order to correct a "fundamental defect" or a "miscarriage of justice". Departures from that principle are justified only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and compelling character (see Kot v. Russia, No. 20887/03, § 24, 18 January 2007, and Protsenko v. Russia, No. 13151/04, §§ 25 - 34, 31 July 2008; and Tishkevich v. Russia, No. 2202/05, §§ 25 - 26, 4 December 2008). In such cases, the Court has to assess, in particular, whether a fair balance was struck between the interests of the applicants and the need to ensure the proper administration of justice, which includes the importance of observing the principle of legal certainty (see, mutatis mutandis, Kurinnyy v. Russia, No. 36495/02, §§ 13, 27 - 28, 12 June 2008).
50. As regards the Government's argument about an allegedly incorrect application of the substantive law, the Court reiterates its constant approach that in the absence of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings a party's disagreement with the assessment made by the lower courts is not a circumstance of a substantial and compelling character warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see Dovguchits v. Russia, No. 2999/03, § 30, 7 June 2007; and Kot, cited above, § 29). As concerns the Government's submission about initial unfairness of the proceedings based on the fact that the absolute majority of the domestic judgments were issued within only two days, nothing suggests that this consideration constituted a ground for the quashing. Such argument was only advanced in the Government's observations. In the absence of any reference to the ground for quashing cited by the Government in the texts of the supervisory-instance rulings, the Court rejects the Government's argument.
51. On the other hand, the Court notes the Government's submission as regards the violation of the jurisdictional rules in the domestic proceedings. As they correctly pointed out, a jurisdictional error or a serious breach of court may, in principle, be regarded as a fundamental defect and therefore justify the quashing (see, among others, Luchkina, cited above).
52. First, the Court notes the Presidium reasoning that the claims directed against the Military Commissariat of the Rostov Region should have been introduced before a district court in Rostov. At the same time, the Court observes that the initial claims in all cases were, in fact, made against two distinct authorities with different legal addresses, namely the Town and Regional Military Commissariats, and the action against the Town Commissariat had been subsequently rejected as unfounded. It appears that according to Article 31 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, such claim could have been lodged with a court having territorial jurisdiction over one of the defendants, upon the claimant's choice, inter alia, with the Novocherkassk Town Court. The Court reiterates its constant approach to the effect that it is primarily for the domestic courts to interpret and apply the domestic law, including the law of procedure. Nevertheless, the Court observes that the Presidium, when quashing the judgments, did not cite any reason as to why the provisions of Article 31 of the CCP did not apply to the applicants' cases.
53. Second, the Court observes that the purported defects in the present group of similar cases could have been cured in the appeal proceedings. A situation where the fi
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