ence principle; he suggested that the statement in question might influence the Tajik courts. Therefore, his right to be presumed innocent had been violated.
B. The Court's assessment
146. The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 2, in its relevant aspect, is aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings. Where no such proceedings are, or have been in existence, statements attributing criminal or other reprehensible conduct are relevant rather to considerations of protection against defamation and adequate access to court to determine civil rights and raising potential issues under Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention (see Zollmann v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 62902/00, 20 November 2003).
147. The presumption of innocence enshrined in paragraph 2 of Article 6 is one of the elements of the fair criminal trial that is required by paragraph 1 (see Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 35, Series A No. 308). It prohibits the premature expression by the tribunal itself of the opinion that the person "charged with a criminal offence" is guilty before he has been so proved according to law (see Minelli v. Switzerland, 25 March 1983, § 37, Series A No. 62) but also covers statements made by other public officials about pending criminal investigations which encourage the public to believe the suspect guilty and prejudge the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority (see Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, § 41, and {Butkevicius} v. Lithuania, No. 48297/99, § 49, ECHR 2002-II).
148. The Court has already found that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is applicable where extradition proceedings are a direct consequence, and the concomitant, of the criminal investigation pending against an individual in the receiving State (see Ismoilov and Others, cited above, § 164) and sees no reason to depart from this approach in the present case.
149. The Court further reiterates that the presumption of innocence will be violated if a judicial decision or a statement by a public official concerning a person charged with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before he has been proved guilty according to law (see Garycki v. Poland, No. 14348/02, § 66, 6 February 2007). A fundamental distinction must be made between a statement that someone is merely suspected of having committed a crime and a clear declaration, in the absence of a final conviction, that an individual has committed the crime in question. The Court has consistently emphasised the importance of the choice of words by public officials in their statements before a person has been tried and found guilty of a particular criminal offence (see {Bohmer} v. Germany, No. 37568/97, §§ 54 and 56, 3 October 2002, and {Nestak} v. Slovakia, No. 65559/01, §§ 88 and 89, 27 February 2007). Whether a statement of a public official is in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence must be determined in the context of the particular circumstances in which the impugned statement was made (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, No. 42095/98, § 43, ECHR 2000-X, and A.L. v. Germany, No. 72758/01, § 31, 28 April 2005).
150. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court points out that the extradition order of 20 November 2008 stated that "[t]he actions of [Mr] M. Khaydarov are punishable under the Russian criminal law and correspond to Article 209 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code" (see paragraph 21 above). In the Court's view, the sentence in question refers first and foremost to the classification of the acts with which the applicant was charged in Tajikistan under Russian law. Although the wording employed by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office was rather unfortunate since there was no clear indication of the fact that the applicant had been merely suspected of havin
> 1 2 3 ... 19 20 21 22
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
