e conducting a special operation and to obey the servicemen's legitimate orders.
74. The applicant insisted that her deceased relatives had been civilians, who had posed no danger to servicemen. She further submitted that her relatives had been driving from Gekhi to Roshni-Chu early in the evening, when it had still been light out; that the left side of the lorry cab had contained numerous bullet holes, which demonstrated that the gunfire had been intense and that it had been opened to kill the driver and the passengers; that after the shooting Petimat Aydamirova and her minor son Ibragim Suleymanov had been alive and screamed for help but had been killed by the servicemen; that the holes in the ground and the remains of the brain tissue had clearly indicated that a final shot had been fired into the applicant's relatives' heads; that the servicemen had attempted to eliminate the evidence and get rid of the corpses; and that the fact that the domestic authorities had opened a criminal investigation into the events demonstrated the unlawfulness of the actions of the military. She contended therefore that the use of force by State agents which had led to the loss of her relatives' lives had been clearly disproportionate in the circumstances of the case and could not be regarded as justified under Article 2 § 2 of the Convention. The applicant stressed that the Government had not submitted any convincing arguments or documentary evidence to the contrary.
2. The Court's assessment
a. Admissibility
75. The Court considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. Further, the Court has already found that the Government's objection concerning the alleged non-exhaustion of criminal domestic remedies should be joined to the merits of the complaint (see paragraph 71 above). The complaint under Article 2 of the Convention must therefore be declared admissible.
b. Merits
76. The Court reiterates that Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances where deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, to which in peacetime no derogation is permitted under Article 15. The situations where deprivation of life may be justified are exhaustive and must be narrowly interpreted. The use of force which may result in the deprivation of life must be no more than "absolutely necessary" for the achievement of one of the purposes set out in Article 2 § 2 (a), (b) and (c). This term indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in a democratic society" under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 146 - 50, Series A No. 324,; Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, 9 October 1997, pp. 2097 - 98, § 171, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI; and {Ogur} v. Turkey [GC], No. 21594/93, § 78, ECHR 1999-III).
77. In addition to setting out the circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified, Article 2 implies a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place an a
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