rought by judge B. the domestic court had sought to protect the judiciary against gratuitous attacks and that there had therefore been no interference with the applicant's freedom of expression. They concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
32. The applicant maintained his complaint.
A. Admissibility
33. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
34. The Court finds it indisputable that the civil proceedings for defamation against the applicant constituted interference with his freedom of expression and that this interference was in accordance with the law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the plaintiff's reputation. It remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society".
35. According to the Court's well-established case-law, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for individual self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no "democratic society". As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions, which must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be established convincingly.
36. The test of "necessity in a democratic society" requires the Court to determine whether the "interference" complained of corresponded to a "pressing social need", whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient (see Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), 26 April 1979, § 62, Series A No. 30). In assessing whether such a "need" exists and what measures should be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities are left a certain margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not, however, unlimited but goes hand in hand with a European supervision by the Court, whose task it is to give a final ruling on whether a restriction is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10. The Court's task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the national authorities but rather to review under Article 10, in the light of the case as a whole, the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation (see, among many other authorities, Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], No. 23118/93, § 43, ECHR 1999-VIII).
37. The Court considers that, unlike in the vast majority of cases that have been examined by the Court, the defamation claim in the present case was born out of the applicant's request to institute criminal proceedings against judge B. rather than out of publication in the media (see, by contrast, Dyuldin and Kislov v. Russia, No. 25968/02, §§ 40 - 41, 31 July 2007). When writing his letters of 23 March and 12 May 2000, the applicant was acting in his personal capacity as a private individual, not as a journalist.
38. As regards judge B.'s personal situation, the Court reiterates that it may be necessary to protect public servants from offensive, abusive and defamatory attacks which are calculated to affect them in the performance of their duties and to damage public confidence in them and the office they hold (see Janowski v. Poland [GC], No. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I). It is even more important when it come
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