s to judges since allegations of unlawful behaviour accusing judges of having broken the law or of having breached their professional obligations may not only damage those judges' reputations, but also undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a whole (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 36, Series A No. 313).
39. The Court notes at the same time that the applicant did not disseminate the information attacking judge B.'s integrity via the media. He merely reported the acts which he believed to be unlawful to a body empowered to institute criminal proceedings, using wording that was not abusive or offensive. In the Court's view, by doing so the applicant acted within the framework established by law for making complaints (see, in a similar context, Zakharov v. Russia, No. 14881/03, § 22, 5 October 2006).
40. The Court reiterates in that connection that it is one of the precepts of the rule of law that citizens should be able to notify competent State officials about conduct of civil servants which to them appears irregular or unlawful (see Zakharov, cited above, § 26). The important role that the judiciary plays in a democratic society cannot in itself immunise judges from being targets of citizens' complaints.
41. As the applicant set out his grievances in correspondence submitted in his private capacity, the requirements of protection under Article 10 of the Convention have to be weighed not in relation to the interests of freedom of the press or of open discussion of matters of public concern but rather against the applicant's right to report irregularities in the conduct of an official to a body competent to deal with such complaints (see Kazakov v. Russia, No. 1758/02, § 28, 18 December 2008).
42. It is true that, unlike politicians, judge B. could not be said to have laid herself open to public scrutiny, and she thus needed to enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue perturbation when on duty (see Janowski, cited above, § 33). However, the need to ensure that civil servants benefit from public confidence in such conditions can justify interference with freedom of expression only where there is a real threat in this respect (see Raichinov v. Bulgaria, No. 47579/99, § 48, 20 April 2006). The applicant's letters obviously did not pose such a threat. Furthermore, their contents were not made known to the general public; thus no press or other form of publicity was involved (see, by contrast, Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], No. 49017/99, § 79, ECHR 2004-XI). The negative impact, if any, of the applicant's words on Judge B.'s reputation was therefore quite limited.
43. Lastly, the Court has to consider whether the sanction imposed on the applicant was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. In its view an award of damages of RUB 20,000 imposed for filing a request to institute criminal proceedings against a judge appears to be disproportionately severe.
44. In view of the foregoing considerations and assessing the text of the letter as a whole and the context in which it was written, the Court finds that the defamation proceedings resulted in an excessive and disproportionate burden being placed on the applicant. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. Other alleged violations of the Convention
45. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant claimed that he had been a victim of racketeers who had used the assistance of some public officials and judges to defraud him. According to the applicant, the court proceedings against the racketeers had been in breach of the requirement of Article 6 and generally unfair.
46. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and as far as it is within its competence, the Court finds that the applicant's submissions disclo
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