to defend himself in person must be able to have recourse to legal assistance of one's own choosing (see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, 28 June 1984, § 99, Series A No. 80, and Pakelli v. Germany, 25 April 1983, § 31, Series A No. 64). The national court may override the defendant's wish relating to legal representation when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice (see Croissant v. Germany, 25 September 1992, §§ 29 and 30, Series A No. 237-B).
99. Assigning counsel does not in itself ensure the effectiveness of the assistance this counsel may provide to his client (see Czekalla v. Portugal, No. 38830/97, § 60, ECHR 2002-VIII). Nevertheless, a State cannot be held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal-aid purposes. It follows from the independence of the legal profession from the State that the conduct of the defence is essentially a matter between the defendant and his counsel, whether appointed under a legal-aid scheme or privately financed. The competent national authorities are required under Article 6 § 3 (c) to intervene only if a failure by legal-aid counsel to provide effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way (ibid).
100. As regards the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent, the Court reiterates that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of a fair procedure. Their aim is to provide an accused person with protection against improper compulsion by the authorities and thus to avoid miscarriages of justice and secure the aims of Article 6 (see Bykov v. Russia [GC], No. 4378/02, § 92, with further references). The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent and presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seeks to prove the case against the accused without resorting to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court must examine the nature and degree of the compulsion, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedures and the use to which any material so obtained is put (ibid.).
101. The Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in which the offence charged will be considered at the trial (see Salduz, cited above, § 54). At the same time, an accused often finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by the assistance of a lawyer whose task is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], No. 54810/00, § 100, ECHR 2006-..., and Kolu v. Turkey, No. 35811/97, § 51, 2 August 2005). Early access to a lawyer is part of the procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination (see, mutatis mutandis, Jalloh, cited above, § 101).
(ii) Waiver
102. The Court reiterates that a waiver of a right
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