guaranteed by the Convention - in so far as it is permissible - must not run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an unequivocal manner and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to the waiver's importance (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], No. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-...). Moreover, before an accused can be said to have impliedly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (see Talat {Tunc} v. Turkey, No. 32432/96, § 59, 27 March 2007, and Jones v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 30900/02, 9 September 2003).
(b) Application of the general principles in the present case
(i) Legal assistance in pre-trial proceedings
103. The Court observes that the main thrust of the applicant's complaint relating to the pre-trial period is threefold:
- the applicant was not afforded an opportunity to retain counsel of his choice (Mr K. or another counsel retained by his family);
- legal-aid counsel D. was inefficient;
- as a result of the above, the applicant confessed without the benefit of effective legal advice.
104. The Court considers that the central issue raised by the applicant's case is his allegation that he was prevailed upon in a coercive environment to incriminate himself without the benefit of effective legal advice.
105. The Court observes at the outset that the relevant facts are in dispute between the parties, especially as to the circumstances of the applicant's admissions to the murder-related charges.
106. First, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the Court accords weight to the applicant's argument that he was not allowed to contact his next of kin after the arrest. There is no evidence showing that the investigator immediately informed the family of the applicant's arrest or that the applicant asked him not to do so. The Court considers that affording a detainee a possibility to make his family aware of his or her arrest is an important safeguard against arbitrary detention and is intended to facilitate his or her decision concerning the exercise of the right to legal assistance, as well as the privilege against self-incrimination and right to remain silent (see also paragraphs 61 and 62 above). The Court considers that already between 3 and 6 February 2001 the applicant found himself in a vulnerable position.
107. The Government contested that the applicant had expressed any wish to be represented by Mr K. The Court does not need to determine whether the applicant named Mr K. during that period and whether a conflict of interest legitimately prevented K. from representing him (see paragraph 10 above). The fact remains that, as confirmed by the investigator at the trial (see paragraph 32 above), the applicant did not want to ensure his own defence and did assert his right to counsel. It was thus the authorities' obligation to ensure that he be able to exercise that right, for instance, by contacting a lawyer by telephone or by other available means. The applicant made his intention to be assisted by counsel sufficiently clear to make it imperative for the investigating authorities to give him the benefit of legal assistance, unless there existed compelling reasons justifying the denial to the applicant of access to a lawyer (see Panovits v. Cyprus, No. 4268/04, § 66, 11 December 2008, and Pishchalnikov v. Russia, No. 7025/04, § 73, 24 September 2009).
108. The Court observes in that connection that the applicant was not offered the services of a legal-aid counsel until 6 February 2001, that is, several days after his arrest. The Court accepts that the interests of justice required that the applicant be afforded free legal assistance. Bearing in mind that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights which are pr
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