actical and effective, the Court has to assess the effectiveness of counsel D.'s assistance. In other words, the Court has to determine whether the assistance by the legal-aid counsel appointed by the investigator was such as to secure the compliance with the guarantees of Article 6 in the circumstances of the case, in particular for preventing any breach of the privilege against self-incrimination and the effective exercise of the right to remain silent.
109. On 6 and 7 February 2001 the applicant declined the services of counsel D., as he was awaiting counsel to be retained by his mother, and apparently because he did not trust D. The applicant chose to remain silent. However, in the circumstances detailed below, on 13, 20 and 26 February 2001 the applicant made confessions in respect of several particularly serious offences. Mr D. was considered as the applicant's counsel and was thus required to sign the record. However, having examined the available material, the Court considers that there are serious grounds to believe that during the relevant period the applicant was questioned on numerous occasions without effective legal advice.
110. Indeed, after the applicant had first made admissions in relation to victim F. the authorities took measures at constituting a group of investigators on account of "the complexity of the case and the large amount of work to be done". Moreover, the police department assigned several officers to verify through a "series of operational and search measures" whether the applicant was involved in the recent disappearances of female students from a local university. The Court does not exclude that there could have been certain circumstances in F.'s and G.'s cases, for instance a common modus operandi, which raised a reasonable suspicion against the applicant beyond the events concerning those victims.
111. As can be seen from the extract from the visitors' logbook produced by the applicant at the trial and before the Court, various police officers visited the applicant in relay on a virtually daily basis in the temporary detention centre. Importantly, no plausible explanation was given for the discrepancies in the timing of the officers' and investigators' visits to the applicant, on one hand, and counsel D.'s presence or absence in the remand centre, on the other. Counsel was present only for the purpose of questioning by the investigator or when certain investigative measures were carried out, for instance a photo identification. There is no indication that the applicant validly waived his right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of the above "talks" with the officers. The Court was afforded no means for verifying that the "talks" did not concern the crimes which the applicant eventually admitted. In fact, the respondent State did not attempt to clarify the nature of those "talks" so as to dispel any doubts about their inappropriate character (compare Ebbinge v. the Netherlands (dec.), No. 47240/99, ECHR 2000-IV, concerning the use of a particular interrogation technique).
112. Despite the complexity of the situation in which the applicant found himself at that stage of the proceedings, the Court found no indication that counsel D. took any measures for his client beyond merely signing the record on several occasions (see, by contrast, {Kuralic} v. Croatia, No. 50700/07, § 48, 15 October 2009). This is particularly worrying against the background of the above-mentioned visits from police officers. The Court also finds it established that the applicant was not allowed to see next of kin throughout the month of February 2001 (see paragraph 32 above).
113. The fact that the applicant refused the services of counsel D. amounted to a clear indication that the applicant experienced difficulties with legal representation. Being faced with the applicant's rejection of counsel D., the investigators wer
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