vember 2007, and Novinskiy, cited above, § 104). The Court finds that these considerations hold true in the circumstances of the present case, since the events at issue had taken place around seven years before the warders gave their statements, and it is clear from the way the statements are formulated that the warders based them on their personal recollections and not on any objective data. In the circumstances of the case and given the lack of any original prison documentation, the Court finds no objective reason to attach greater weight to those statements compared to those made, for instance, by the inmates referred to by the applicant. Overall, the Court finds that the Government have not accounted properly for their failure to support their account with copies of the original prison documentation, with the result that the Court may draw inferences from their conduct.
156. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, and bearing in mind that the evaluation of the evidence and the establishment of the facts is a matter for the Court, and that it is incumbent on it to decide on the evidentiary value of the documents submitted to it (see {Celikbilek} v. Turkey, No. 27693/95, § 71, 31 May 2005), the Court will therefore have to establish the facts on the basis of the case file materials which it considers reliable.
157. The Court observes at the outset that the applicant remained in detention in the IZ-62/1 for slightly over two years and six months, namely from 29 March 2000 until 30 September 2002, the date of her release on parole. In this latter respect, the Court rejects as erroneous the Government's submission in their observations of 15 December 2004 to the effect that the applicant had been released on 29 September 2002, given that in their additional observations of 7 September 2007 the Government indicated 30 September 2002 as the date of the applicant's release, the same date being mentioned in the certificate of 21 August 2007 (see paragraphs 74 and 76 above). Although the parties disagreed as to the exact number of cells in which the applicant was detained and the exact number of inmates per cell, there was no allegation of overcrowding beyond the design capacity or of a shortage of sleeping places (see, by contrast, Grishin v. Russia, No. 30983/02, § 89, 15 November 2007, and Kalashnikov v. Russia, No. 47095/99, § 97, ECHR 2002-VI). Moreover, even on the basis of the applicant's description it is clear that during her detention in the IZ-62/1 she was mostly afforded no less than four square metres, and from no later than November 2000 until her release, no less than seven square metres, of living space (see paragraph 77 above).
158. The Court further reiterates that in a number of cases where the overcrowding was not so severe as to raise in itself an issue under Article 3 of the Convention, it noted other aspects of physical conditions of detention as being relevant for its assessment of compliance with that provision. Such elements included, in particular, the opportunity to use the toilet in private, availability of ventilation, access to natural light or air, adequacy of heating arrangements, and compliance with basic sanitary requirements. Thus, even in cases where a larger prison cell was at issue - measuring in the range of three to four square metres per inmate - the Court found a violation of Article 3 since the space factor was coupled with the established lack of ventilation and lighting (see, for example, Vlasov v. Russia, No. 78146/01, § 84, 12 June 2008; Babushkin v. Russia, No. 67253/01, § 44, 18 October 2007; Trepashkin v. Russia, No. 36898/03, § 94, 19 July 2007; and Peers v. Greece, No. 28524/95, §§ 70 - 72, ECHR 2001-III). The Court therefore has to satisfy itself that in the instant case the other conditions of the applicant's detention can be regarded as compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.
159. The Court observes first o
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