ht of appeal is provided in domestic law, Article 6 § 1 applies to such appellate procedures (see Delcourt v. Belgium, 17 January 1970, § 25, Series A No. 11). The right of access to an appeal court is not absolute and the State, which is permitted to place limitations on the right of appeal, enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in relation to such limitations (see Brualla Gomez de la Torre v. Spain, 19 December 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, and De Ponte Nascimento v. the United Kingdom, (dec.), No. 55331/00, 31 January 2002). The Court reiterates, however, that the limitations in question must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Levages Prestations Services v. France, 23 October 1996, § 40, Reports 1996-V).
52. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court points out that under domestic law the applicant was entitled to lodge a regular appeal against the first-instance judgment in his civil case within ten days from the delivery of the text of the first-instance judgment in its final form (see paragraph 42 above). It reiterates in this respect that the rules governing the formal steps to be taken in lodging an appeal are aimed at ensuring the proper administration of justice. Litigants should expect the existing rules to be applied. However, the rules in question, or the application thereof, should not prevent persons amenable to the law from making use of an available remedy (see {Societe} <*> Anonyme Sotiris and Nikos Koutras Attee v. Greece, No. 39442/98, § 20, ECHR 2000-XII).
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<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
53. The reason why the applicant's appeal was not examined by the domestic courts is that the district court found that the applicant had failed to comply with the time-limit for lodging his appeal. The Court observes in this connection that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The role of the Court is limited to verifying whether the effects of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see Maresti v. Croatia, No. 55759/07, § 36, 25 June 2009).
54. However, the right to the effective protection of the courts entails that the parties to civil proceedings must be able to avail themselves of the right to lodge an appeal from the moment they can effectively apprise themselves of court decisions which may infringe their legitimate rights or interests (see Miragall Escolano and Others v. Spain, Nos. 38366/97, 38688/97, 40777/98, 40843/98, 41015/98, 41400/98, 41446/98, 41484/98, 41487/98 and 41509/98, § 37, ECHR 2000-I). Given that the applicant was not able to become acquainted with the district court's reasoned judgment before 4 September 2003 (see paragraph 35 above), he cannot not be said to have had an effective right to appeal against it prior to that date.
55. In the Court's opinion, the fact that the applicant had no opportunity to study the text of the first-instance judgment prior to lodging his appeal is difficult to reconcile with Article 6 of the Convention, which, according to the Court's established case-law, embodies as a principle linked to the proper administration of justice the requirement that court decisions should adequately state the reasons on which they are based (see {Garcia} Ruiz v. Spain [GC], No. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999-I, and Angel Angelov v. Bulgaria, No. 51343/99, § 38, 15 February 2007).
56. It is true that the Government argued that the applicant could have gained access to appeal proceedings by filing a specific request for restoration of the procedural t
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