erm for lodging an appeal. The Court notes that it is not entirely clear whether the applicant actually missed the term in question since, first, the reasoned judgment in its final form was prepared only on 3 September 2003 and, secondly, the judgment became final on 29 October 2003 (see paragraph 38 above). Supposing, however, for argument's sake, that the term for lodging an appeal expired before 25 July 2003, as suggested by the district court (see paragraph 34 above), the Court observes that in his appeal statement and complaint to the city court of 11 July 2003 the applicant referred to the district court's failure to provide him with the reasoned text of the judgment within the term established by law and unequivocally stated that he wished to appeal against the judgment in question (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above). Therefore the applicant may be considered to have made an implied request to restore the procedural term. To assume the contrary would, in the Court's view, be excessively formalistic. Furthermore, given that the manner in which the court proceedings had been administered contributed to the applicant's failure to comply with a time-limit for lodging an appeal, it was for the national courts to restore the time-limit in question on their own motion.
57. In sum, the Court concludes that the district court interpreted a procedural rule on time-limits in such a way as to prevent the applicant's appeal being examined on the merits, with the effect that the latter's right to the effective protection of the courts was infringed (see, mutatis mutandis, {Zvolsky} and {Zvolska} v. the Czech Republic, No. 46129/99, § 51, ECHR 2002-IX, and Fetaovski v. "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", No. 10649/03, § 39, 19 June 2008).
58. Lastly, the Court observes that the Government admitted the district court judge's failure to comply with a legal requirement to produce a reasoned judgment within five days from the date of its pronouncement. It follows that the applicant was prevented from effectively exercising his right to appeal solely because of the district court's failure to perform its duty and provide him with a finalised text of the judgment in a timely fashion.
59. All in all, having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Court finds that the applicant did not enjoy a practical, effective right of access to court.
60. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of lack of access to court.
(b) Length of proceedings
61. The Court will now examine whether the length of the civil proceedings instituted by the applicant was "reasonable". It points out that the parties made no submissions as to the exact period to be taken into consideration. It considers that the relevant period started in July 1998, when the applicant brought his claims before the district court. In the absence of the parties' submissions as to the exact date on which the proceedings ended, the Court is ready to accept that they were pending until the date when the judgment of 26 February 2003 became final. Given that the official stamp on the text of the first-instance judgment defines the date in question as 29 October 2003 (see paragraph 38 above), the Court finds that the overall length of the proceedings amounts to almost five years and three months.
62. The Court notes that the prevailing part of this period relates to the examination of the applicant's civil case in the first instance and points out that the first-instance proceedings could not be regarded as completed until the moment when a party to the proceedings has an opportunity to become acquainted with a reasoned written text of the first-instance decision, irrespective of whether it was previously delivered orally (see, mutatis mutandis, Soares Fernandes v. Portugal, No. 59017/00, § 17, 8 April 2004, and Gro
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