Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 04.03.2010 «Дело Савенкова (Savenkova) против России» [англ.]

a, No. 45100/98, § 91, 8 February 2005; Klyakhin v. Russia, No. 46082/99, § 57, 30 November 2004; and Labita, cited above, §§ 145 and 147).
81. The Court notes that the date and time of the applicant's initial arrest is disputed by the parties; however, the Court considers a difference of several hours immaterial for the purposes of assessing the length of the period at issue in the present case. It will assume that the applicant was taken into custody no later than on 5 July 2001, on which date the applicant was already in detention according to both parties. From that point on the applicant was detained within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention until her conviction by the Tambov Regional Court on 14 March 2002. From the latter date until 23 October 2002, when the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 14 March 2002, she was detained "after conviction by a competent court", within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a), and therefore that period of detention falls outside the scope of Article 5 § 3 (see B. v Austria, 28 March 1990, §§ 33 - 39, Series A No. 175, and {Kudla}, cited above, § 104). From 23 October 2002 to 9 April 2003 she was again in pre-trial detention falling under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
82. In order to assess the length of the applicant's pre-trial detention, the Court must make an overall evaluation of the accumulated periods of detention under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see, as recent authorities, Belov, cited above, § 102; Mishketkul and Others v. Russia, No. 36911/02, § 40, 24 May 2007; and Solmaz v. Turkey, No. 27561/02, §§ 34 - 37, ECHR 2007-... (extracts)). Consequently, having added together the two aforementioned periods, the Court concludes that the applicant was detained within the meaning of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention for one year, one month and twenty-five days.
(ii) Grounds for the continued detention
83. The Court notes that the Government, with reference to the detention orders issued in this case, advanced three principal reasons for the applicant to remain in detention, namely, the serious nature of the offence, which carried a prison sentence of significant length, the fact that the applicant would be likely to abscond, and the risk of her obstructing the course of justice.
84. The Court notes that the applicant's detention could initially have been warranted by these considerations. However, the Court reiterates in this respect that the authorities cannot justify continuing detention by a mere reference to such risks; they must refer to specific facts concerning the applicant's behaviour, his personal circumstances, and so on (see Vlasov, cited above, § 108). Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, No. 54071/00, § 67, 7 April 2005).
85. In the present case the domestic authorities did not refer to any concrete facts and did not indicate any circumstance which suggested that, if released, the applicant would abscond or otherwise upset the course of the trial. Even if the domestic authorities were aware of any such matters, none were mentioned in the decisions concerning detention and it is not the Court's task to establish such matters and take the place of the national authorities who ruled on the issue of detention (see Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, § 72, 8 June 2006). The Court therefore finds that the existence of such risks was not established.
86. The Court also notes that with the passing of time the courts' reasoning did not evolve to reflect the developing situation or to verify whether these grounds remained valid at the advanced stages of the



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