d been reasonable.
61. The applicant disagreed with the Government's position. Contesting their objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as regarded the period between 4 July 2001 and 14 March 2002, she claimed that on 10 December 2001 she had complained about her detention to the Tambov Regional Court, but that the complaint had not been examined. Instead, on 19 December 2001, the court had ordered her detention to continue. She maintained that her detention had been neither lawful nor justified throughout the proceedings.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
62. The Court observes that the applicant's complaints refer to her initial arrest on 4 - 5 July 2001, her pre-trial detention between 6 July 2001 and 4 December 2001, and also the period of detention after the transfer of the case file to the court which ended with the applicant's conviction on 14 March 2002 (the first set of proceedings); further complaints relate to her detention between 23 October 2002, when the case was remitted for fresh examination following the supervisory review, and 9 April 2003 when she was acquitted (the second set of proceedings). As regards the first set of proceedings, the Court notes that the last decision concerning the lawfulness of the applicant's detention during that period was taken by the Tambov Regional Court on 19 December 2001, that is, more than six months before 8 July 2002, when the applicant lodged her application with the Court. Accordingly this part of the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention (see Salmanov v. Russia (dec.), No. 3522/04, 19 January 2006; Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, § 44, 8 June 2006; {Pavlik} v. Slovakia, No. 74827/01, § 89, 30 January 2007; and Ignatov v. Russia, No. 27193/02, § 71, 24 May 2007).
63. The Court further observes that it has competence to examine the applicant's complaint relating to the second set of proceedings. The Court notes that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) General principles
64. The Court reiterates that the expressions "lawful" and "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" in Article 5 § 1 essentially refer to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. However, the "lawfulness" of detention under domestic law is not always the decisive element. The Court must in addition be satisfied that detention during the period under consideration was compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which is to prevent persons from being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion.
65. The Court must moreover ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court stresses that, where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person - if need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see {Jecius} v. Lithuania, No. 34578/97, § 56, ECHR 2000-IX, and Baranowski v. Poland, No. 28358/95, §§ 50 - 52, ECHR 2000-III).
(b) Application of the
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