cle 6 of the Convention comes into play as soon as a person is "charged"; this may occur on a date prior to the case coming before the trial court, such as the date of arrest, the date when the person concerned was officially notified that he would be prosecuted or the date when preliminary investigations were opened (see Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, § 73, Series A No. 51, and more recently, O'Halloran and Francis v. the United Kingdom [GC], Nos. 15809/02 and 25624/02, § 35, ECHR 2007-...). "Charge", for the purposes of Article 6 § 1, may be defined as "the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence", a definition that also corresponds to the test whether "the situation of the [person] has been substantially affected" (see Shabelnik v. Ukraine, No. 16404/03, § 57, 19 February 2009; Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, § 46, Series A No. 35; and Saunders v. the United Kingdom, 17 December 1996, §§ 67 and 74, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI). Given the context of the road check and the applicant's inability to produce any proof of the diesel purchase at the moment of his questioning by the police, the Court considers that there should have been a suspicion of theft against the applicant at that moment.
43. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court notes that the trial court's use made of the admissions made on 21 February 2001, which led to the institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant and then served for convicting him of theft, is at the heart of the applicant's complaints under Article 6 of the Convention (compare Saunders, cited above, §§ 67 and 74; and Allen v. the United Kingdom (dec.), No. 76574/01, 10 September 2002). It is also noted that the inspection record itself indicated Article 178 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure as the legal basis for the inspection (see paragraph 26 above). Thus, although the applicant was not accused of any criminal offence on 21 February 2001, the proceedings on that date "substantially affected" his situation. The Court accepts that Article 6 of the Convention was engaged in the present case. Nor was there any disagreement on this point between the parties.
44. The Court further notes that the main thrust of the applicant's complaint is that he was convicted on the basis of his pre-trial admissions made without the benefit of legal advice. It is noted that the respondent Government did not plead that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies by failing to raise in substance the above issue on appeal against the trial judgment. Thus, the Court will examine the merits of the applicant's complaint.
45. Although the Court has accepted that Article 6 of the Convention was applicable in the pre-trial proceedings in the present case (see paragraph 43 above), the Court repeats that the manner in which the guarantees of its paragraphs 1 and 3 (c) are to be applied in pre-trial proceedings depends on the special features of those proceedings and the circumstances of the case assessed in relation to the entirety of the domestic proceedings conducted in the case.
(i) Legal assistance
46. The Court notes at the outset that the applicant only complained that he had not been afforded enough time to contact a lawyer in a nearby town. The Court cannot but note that, as confirmed by the applicant's representative in his letter to the European Court dated 26 July 2002, both on 21 February and 2 March 2001 the applicant "chose not to exercise his right to legal representation with the hope that the court would give him a fair trial even without counsel".
47. Moreover, the Court observes that the present case is different from previous cases concerning the right to legal assistance in pre-trial proceedings (see Salduz [GC], §§ 12 - 17 and {Ocalan} [GC], § 131, both cit
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