ed above; see also Shabelnik, cited above, § 59; Panovits v. Cyprus, No. 4268/04, §§ 7 - 10, 11 December 2008; Kolu v. Turkey, No. 35811/97, §§ 14 - 22, 2 August 2005; Brennan v. the United Kingdom, No. 39846/98, § 41, ECHR 2001-X; Quinn v. Ireland, No. 36887/97, §§ 10 - 13, 21 December 2000; Averill v. the United Kingdom, No. 36408/97, § 55, ECHR 2000-VI; Magee v. the United Kingdom, No. 28135/95, §§ 8 - 15, ECHR 2000-VI; and Imbrioscia, §§ 9 - 19, cited above) because the applicant was not formally arrested or interrogated in police custody. He was stopped for a road check. This check and the applicant's self-incriminating statements were both carried out and made in public in the presence of two attesting witnesses. It is true that the trial record contains a statement by the applicant suggesting that the writing down of the inspection record and/or his subsequent statement were started on the spot but were completed in the village of Birofeld. Nevertheless, the Court concludes on the basis of the materials in the case file that the relevant events, namely the drawing of the inspection record and the taking of the applicant's explanation, were carried out in a direct sequence of events.
48. Although the applicant in the present case was not free to leave, the Court considers that the circumstances of the case as presented by the parties, and established by the Court, disclose no significant curtailment of the applicant's freedom of action, which could be sufficient for activating a requirement for legal assistance already at this stage of the proceedings.
49. The Court notes that the role of the police in a situation such as in the present case was to draw up an inspection record and receive the applicant's explanation as to the origin of the cans in his car (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). Having done so, the police transferred the documents to the inquirer who, in his turn, compiled a report to his superior indicating that there was a case to answer against the applicant on suspicion of theft (see paragraph 12 above). This report prompted the inquirer's superior to open a criminal case against the applicant (see paragraph 13 above).
50. At that stage, namely on 2 March 2001, the applicant was apprised of his right to legal assistance. It was open to him to consult a lawyer before attending the meeting on 2 March 2001. At that meeting the applicant was presented with the version of the events based on his statements made on 21 February 2001. The applicant voluntarily and unequivocally agreed to sign the act of accusation and waived his right to legal assistance, indicating that he would defend himself at the trial.
51. The foregoing considerations suffice for the Court to conclude that the absence of legal representation on 21 February and 2 March 2001 did not violate the applicant's right to legal assistance under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention.
(ii) Privilege against self-incrimination and right to remain silent
52. Concerning the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent, the Court has already held that the circumstances of the case disclosed the existence of a suspicion of theft against the applicant after he had failed to prove the fuel purchase (see paragraph 42 above). It is not without relevance in that connection that when putting in writing the applicant's "explanations", officer B considered it necessary to apprise him of the privilege against self-incrimination. In the Court's opinion, this fact also gives credence to the argument suggesting that already at that time the authorities suspected the applicant of theft. The Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical and effective (see Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 24, Series A No. 32). The Court considers that in the circumstances of the case it was incumbent on the police to inform the applicant of the privileg
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