lue judgment" and it had been impossible to prove the truth of that opinion. He stressed that the application of a criminal-law sanction to him had been an unjustified and disproportionate measure.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Admissibility
145. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
146. The Court notes that on 12 February 2003 the Justice of the Peace convicted the applicant of aggravated libel and sentenced him to one year's probation. The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Leninskiy District Court and subsequently by the Smolensk Regional Court. The Court therefore considers that the conviction constituted an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. It remains to be examined whether such interference was "prescribed by law", pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and was "necessary in a democratic society" to attain such aim or aims (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, §§ 34 - 37, Series A No. 103).
(a) "Prescribed by law"
147. Both parties agreed that the interference was based on the application of Article 129 of the Russian Criminal Code. The Court sees no reason to hold that the interference was not lawful and therefore concludes that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression was "prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 § 2.
(b) Legitimate aim
148. The parties agreed that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was aimed at protecting the rights and reputation of others, namely of Mr M. The Court also agrees that the interference had a legitimate aim.
(c) "Necessary in a democratic society"
(i) General principles
149. The Court recalls that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no "democratic society". This freedom is subject to the exceptions set out in Article 10 paragraph 2, which must, however, be construed strictly (see, inter alia, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, § 46, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI; Tammer v. Estonia, No. 41205/98, § 59, ECHR 2001-I; and Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, No. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005).
150. In its practice, the Court has distinguished between statements of fact and value judgments. While the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. Where a statement amounts to a value judgment the proportionality of an interference may depend on whether there exists a sufficient factual basis for the impugned statement, since even a value judgment without any factual basis to support it may be excessive (see, for example, {Unabhangige} Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, No. 28525/95, §§ 39 - 40, ECHR 2002-I; and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], No. 49017/99, § 76, ECHR 2004-XI).
151. The notion of necessity implies a pressing social need. The Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in this respect, but this goes hand in hand with a European supervision which is more or less extensive depending on the circumstances. In reviewing under Article 10 the decisions taken by the national authorities pursuant
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