Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 22.12.2009 «Дело Макаренко (Makarenko) против России» [англ.]

to their margin of appreciation, the Convention organs must determine, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the interference at issue was "proportionate" to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons adduced by them to justify the interference are "relevant and sufficient" (see, for instance, Hertel, cited above, § 46; Pedersen and Baadsgaard, cited above, §§ 68 - 70; and Steel and Morris, cited above, § 87).
(ii) Application of the principles to the present case
152. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court must weigh a number of factors when reviewing the proportionality of the measure complained of. Firstly, the Court is convinced that the statement that Mr M. had organised an attempt to murder the applicant was clearly an allegation of fact and as such susceptible to proof (see, among many other authorities, McVicar v. the United Kingdom, No. 46311/99, § 83, ECHR 2002-III; Steel and Morris, cited above, §§ 90 in fine and 94; and Panev v. Bulgaria, No. 35125/97, Commission decision of 3 December 1997, unreported). That statement, directed specifically and exclusively at Mr M., established a causal link between the attempt on the applicant's life and Mr M.'s actions. This was explicitly accepted by the domestic courts (see paragraph 54 above). Whether or not an act has a causal link with another is not a matter of speculation, but is a fact susceptible of proof (see Pfeifer v. Austria, No. 12556/03, § 47, ECHR 2007-XII). Having made the offending allegations, the applicant was liable for their truthfulness (see Rumyana Ivanova v. Bulgaria, No. 36207/03, § 62, 14 February 2008).
153. The Court further reiterates its finding (see paragraph 140 above) that in the ensuing proceedings the applicant was allowed to adduce evidence of the truth of his averment (see, by contrast, Colombani and Others v. France, No. 51279/99, § 66, ECHR 2002-V). In view of the nature of that averment, that task was not unreasonable or impossible (see, by contrast, Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 65 in fine, Series A No. 239). However, no such proof was adduced. The only argument put forward by the applicant, pertaining to the alleged threats made by Mr M. two days prior to the attempted murder, was dismissed as false after the alleged witnesses to the threats had refuted the applicant's allegations in open court (see paragraph 54 above). The Court sees no reason to question that finding.
154. The Court is also mindful of the fact that shortly after the press conference at which the defamatory statements had been made, the applicant held another press conference to announce that the assertion about Mr M.'s participation in the attempt on his life was incorrect. The applicant also apologised (see paragraph 54 above). However, the admission and subsequent apology did not detract from the fact that the applicant's initial statements had been made known to a considerable number of individuals, including representatives of the mass media, their readers and employees of the Smolensk Regional Council (see, mutatis mutandis, Radio France and Others v. France, No. 53984/00, §§ 35 and 38 in fine, ECHR 2004-II). Furthermore, the apology, while indicative of the applicant's willingness to rectify the situation, did not fully wipe out the damage inflicted on Mr M.'s reputation. The potential consequences of the allegations made by the applicant during the press conference for an individual who at that time was running for election were grave (see, mutatis mutandis, McVicar, cited above, § 85). In any event, these developments, which took place only after the applicant had been made aware of the institution of the criminal proceedings against him in view of the defamatory nature of the allegations, do not show that the applicant was concerned with verifying their truth or reliability (see Rumyana Ivanova, cited above, § 65, with further references).

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