155. In assessing the necessity of the interference, it is also important to examine the way in which the domestic courts dealt with the case, and in particular whether they applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 of the Convention. A perusal of the judgments by the Justice of the Peace, the Leninskiy District Court and the Smolensk Regional Court (see paragraphs 54, 56 and 58 above) reveals that they fully recognised that the present case involved a conflict between the right to freedom of expression and protection of the reputation or rights of others, a conflict they resolved by weighing the relevant considerations.
156. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the reasons adduced by the national courts for convicting the applicant were relevant and sufficient within the meaning of its case-law. In this connection, the Court is unable to follow the applicant's argument that the very use of criminal-law sanctions in defamation cases is in violation of Article 10. In view of the margin of appreciation left to Contracting States by that provision, a criminal measure as a response to defamation cannot, as such, be considered disproportionate to the aim pursued (see Radio France and Others, cited above, § 40; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], Nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 59, ECHR 2007-...). Nor is it contrary to the Convention to require the defendant to prove, to a reasonable standard, that his allegations were substantially true (see paragraph 153 above). It should also be observed that the proceedings were instituted on the initiative of Mr M., not by a State authority (see, by contrast, Raichinov v. Bulgaria, No. 47579/99, § 50 in fine, 20 April 2006).
157. Lastly, the Court must ensure itself that the penalty to which the applicant was subjected did not upset the balance between his freedom of expression and the need to protect Mr M.'s reputation (see {Cumpana} and {Mazare} v. Romania [GC], No. 33348/96, § 111, ECHR 2004-XI). It considers that the sanction imposed on the applicant - one year's probation - does not, in the specific circumstances of the case, appear excessive. The Court attaches particular weight to the fact that after convicting the applicant, the Justice of the Peace refrained from imposing the maximum sentence envisaged by Article 129 of the Russian Criminal Code (see paragraph 143 above) and opted for probation instead of a prison sentence, taking into account various mitigating circumstances (compare and contrast {Cumpana} and {Mazare}, cited above, §§ 37, 112, 113 in fine and 118). The trial court gave cogent reasons for its ruling on this point, in line with this Court's case-law that a criminal sentence for defamation must bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the injury to reputation suffered (see Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, § 49, Series A No. 316-B; Krutil v. Germany (dec), No. 71750/01, 20 March 2003; Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland, No. 55120/00, § 110, 16 June 2005; and Steel and Morris, cited above, § 96).
158. In sum, in view of the reasons adduced by the national courts for convicting the applicant and of the relative lenience of the punishment imposed on him, the Court is satisfied that the authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation.
159. There has therefore been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
VI. Other alleged violations of the Convention
160. Lastly, the applicant complained of various procedural defects which had allegedly been committed by the investigating authorities and domestic courts in the course of the criminal proceedings against him.
161. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that the evidence discloses no appearance of
> 1 2 3 ... 23 24 25 26 ... 27
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
