ourt has ruled that, guaranteeing to litigants an effective right of access to courts for the determination of their "civil rights and obligations", Article 6 § 1 leaves to the State a free choice of the means to be used towards this end but, while the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in that respect, the final decision as to the observance of the Convention's requirements rests with the Court (see Jedamski and Jedamska v. Poland, No. 73547/01, § 58, 26 July 2005).
27. The Court must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access afforded to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of that right is impaired. Furthermore, the Court underlines that a limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 unless it pursues a legitimate aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aim sought to be achieved (see Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV, p. 1660, § 72; and Kreuz v. Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, No. 28249/95, §§ 54 and 55, ECHR 2001-VI).
28. The Court further reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court's role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention (see {Societe} Anonyme Sotiris and Nikos Koutras Attee v. Greece, No. 39442/98, § 17, ECHR 2000-XII).
29. The requirement to indicate the plaintiff's place of residence is not in itself incompatible with Article 6 § 1. It pursues a legitimate aim of proper administration of justice, as it enables the courts to contact the plaintiff and serve summonses and decisions on him. The Court will however review the circumstances and manner in which that requirement was actually applied to the applicant to determine whether its effects in the particular circumstances of the case have been consonant with the Convention.
30. The Court observes that the applicant did not have a fixed or registered place of residence and was therefore unable to comply with the court's requirement. He brought his inability to indicate his place of residence to the attention of the domestic courts and indicated an address for correspondence instead. However, the domestic courts refused to entertain his claims.
31. No justification was provided by the domestic courts or the Government for such an inflexible application of this procedural rule. Indeed, the domestic courts did not need to know the applicant's place of residence to determine whether they had territorial jurisdiction to entertain his claims as the claims were filed with the court with jurisdiction over the defendant's place of residence, as required by domestic law (see paragraph 17 above). Nor was the place of residence the only valid contact address; an address for correspondence indicated by the applicant was obviously sufficient to enable the courts to keep contact with him. The Court therefore considers that the Russian courts demonstrated excessive and unjustified formalism by insisting that the applicant indicate his place of residence, a requirement that was known to be impossible in the applicant's situation.
32. In holding that the applicant could not take legal proceedings unless he indicated his place of residence the domestic courts did not only penalise his failure to comply with a formal requirement. They also imposed a real restriction on the applicant, preventing him from having his civil claims determined by the courts. What is at stake in the present case is therefore not merely a problem of interpretation of a legal provision in the usual w
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