e for the operation of a State body were allowed to substitute themselves for that body, as had happened with Mr Shulga's filing of a defamation claim in his personal capacity. Finally, the applicants pointed out that the amounts awarded against them had been so excessive compared to their income - approximately one third of their annual income - that the proceedings had definitely had the aim of preventing future critical coverage.
2. The Government
31. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicants' right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, notably Article 152 of the Civil Code which governed the protection of the professional reputation of both citizens and legal entities. The domestic courts found that the facts set out in the publications were not shown to have been true and that there were no grounds to exempt the applicants from responsibility by virtue of section 57 of the Mass-Media Act.
3. The third parties
32. The third parties submitted, firstly, that government agencies were fully equipped, and should be expected, to defend their reputation before the court of public opinion rather than a court of law. The PACE Report urged Russia to introduce a clear ban on the ability of public authorities to institute civil proceedings in order to protect their "reputation" (cited above, § 393). If public authorities were to be included within the meaning of "others" whose reputation or rights Article 10 § 2 was designed to protect, it would subject journalists to a constant risk of harassment through lawsuits and frustrate the media's ability to act as a watchdog of public administration. Mindful of that danger, courts of many jurisdictions barred public authorities from suing in defamation because of the public interest that such authorities must be open to uninhibited public criticism (United Kingdom: Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534; India: Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632; United States: City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595 (1923); South Africa: Die Spoorbond v. South African Railways [1946] AD 999). Some new European democracies have also taken steps to bar government bodies from claiming damages for defamation.
33. Secondly, the third parties indicated that Article 10 would be hollowed out if public officials could substitute themselves for their respective bodies in taking legal action. Here, the relevant test for entertaining a defamation action against the media would be whether the statement at issue was unequivocally "of and concerning" that official. The "group defamation" doctrine has deep roots in the common-law legal tradition (see King v. Alme & Nott, 91 Eng. Rep. 790 (1700) (per curiam); Eastwood v. Holmes, 1 F. & F. 347, 175 Eng. Rep. 758 (1858); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Defamation laws in the continental legal system have similar identification requirements; a plaintiff must be identifiable by name or image or otherwise, in order to have standing to sue for defamation.
34. Finally, the third party pointed out that journalists should not be held liable for defamation for accurately publishing statements contained in non-confidential government documents. The Court has constantly held the view that the press "should normally be entitled, when contributing to public debate on matters of legitimate concern, to rely on the content of official reports without having to undertake independent research" (see Colombani and Others v. France, No. 51279/99, § 47, ECHR 2002-V; also {Selisto} v. Finland, No. 56767/00, § 60, 16 November 2004). A similar well-developed legal doctrine known as the "fair report privilege" has long been entrenched in the United States jurisprudence (Restatement (Second) Torts, § 611 (1977)). It followed that journalists had a right under Article 10 to publis
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