" and "sufficient" grounds to justify his continued detention and whether they displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings. The inordinate length of the applicant's detention is a matter of grave concern for the Court. In these circumstances, the Russian authorities should have put forward very weighty reasons for keeping the applicant in detention for more than six years.
88. The judicial authorities relied, in addition to the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, on the risk of his absconding, reoffending or interfering with witnesses or jurors. In this respect they referred to the gravity of the charges, with particular emphasis on the charge of membership of an armed criminal gang.
89. The gravity of the charges was the main factor for the assessment of the applicant's potential to abscond, reoffend or obstruct the course of justice. Thus, in the appeal decision 28 December 2006 the Supreme Court found that the gravity of the charges outweighed the specific facts militating in favour of the applicant's release, such as the considerable length of his detention pending trial, his permanent place of residence and family situation (see paragraph 32 above). The courts assumed that the gravity of the charge carried such a preponderant weight that no other circumstances could have obtained the applicant's release. The Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk that an accused might abscond or reoffend, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Letellier v. France, judgment of 26 June 1991, Series A No. 207, § 51; see also Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral v. Poland, No. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov, cited above, § 81).
90. Another ground for the applicant's detention was his presumed membership of an organised criminal group. The Court accepts that in cases concerning organised crime the risk that a detainee if released might put pressure on witnesses or might otherwise obstruct the proceedings is often particularly high. These factors can justify a relatively longer period of detention. However, they do not give the authorities unlimited power to extend this preventive measure (see Osuch v. Poland, No. 31246/02, § 26, 14 November 2006, and Celejewski v. Poland, No. 17584/04, §§ 37 - 38, 4 May 2006). Taking into account that the applicant was suspected of being an active member of an organised criminal group, the Court accepts that the authorities could justifiably consider that the risk of pressure on witnesses and jurors was initially present. However, the Court is not persuaded that that ground could in itself justify the entire six-year period of the applicant's detention. Indeed, the domestic courts referred to the risk of hampering the proceedings in a summary fashion without pointing to any aspect of the applicant's character or behaviour in support of their conclusion that he was likely to resort to intimidation. In the Court's view, such a generally formulated risk may not serve as justification for the applicant's detention for a period of more than six years. The domestic courts failed to consider the fact that that ground inevitably became less and less relevant with the passage of time. The courts' reasoning did not evolve to reflect the developing situation or to verify whether at the advanced stage of the proceedings that ground retained its sufficiency. The Court is not therefore convinced that, throughout the entire period of the applicant's detention, compelling reasons existed for a fear that he would interfere with witnesses or jurors or otherwise hamper the examinati
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