on of the case, and certainly not such as to outweigh the applicant's right to trial within a reasonable time or release pending trial.
91. No other grounds have been relied on by the domestic courts. The Government referred in their observations to the absence of a permanent place of residence, employment or dependants. The Court reiterates that it is not its task to assume the role of the national authorities who ruled on the applicant's detention or to supply its own analysis of facts arguing for or against detention (see Nikolov v. Bulgaria, No. 38884/97, § 74, 30 January 2003, and Labita, cited above, § 152). Those arguments were advanced for the first time in the proceedings before the Court and the domestic courts never referred to them in their decisions. In any event, the applicant mentioned in his appeal submissions that he had a permanent place of residence and employment, three minor children, an unemployed wife and an elderly mother (see paragraph 22 above). Those facts were never contested by the investigator or prosecutor.
92. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that during the period from 9 February to 20 May 2004 the applicant was serving a sentence in an unrelated criminal case. Although it is true that the extension orders issued during that period did not affect the applicant's situation in practical terms, as he was in any event being held after conviction by a competent court, this fact is not decisive for the Court's assessment. The existence of a violation is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice or damage; the question whether an applicant has actually been placed in an unfavourable position or sustained damage becomes relevant only in the context of Article 41 (see, among many authorities, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, No. 40825/98, § 67, 31 July 2008; Wassink v. the Netherlands, 27 September 1990, § 38, Series A No. 185-A; and Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 27, Series A No. 31).
93. The Court observes that all decisions extending the applicant's detention were stereotypically worded and in summary form. They did not describe in detail the applicant's personal situation. Although in one of the extension orders the Regional Court stated that it had taken into account "the defendants' characters", this statement was not accompanied by any description of the applicant's character or an explanation as to why it made his detention necessary (see paragraph 30 above). The domestic authorities' reluctance to devote proper attention to discussion of the applicant's personal situation is particularly manifest in the Regional Court's decisions of 20 and 27 April 2004, which gave no grounds whatsoever for the applicant's continued detention. The Regional Court only noted that "the defendants should remain in custody" (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). It is even more striking that by that time the applicant had already spent a year in custody, the investigation had been completed and the case referred for trial.
94. After the case had been submitted for trial in April 2004 the trial court issued collective detention orders using the same summary formula to extend the detention of six persons. The Court has already found that the practice of issuing collective detention orders without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds for detention in respect of each detainee is incompatible in itself with Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Shcheglyuk, cited above, § 45; Korchuganova, cited above, § 76; and Dolgova v. Russia, No. 11886/05, § 49, 2 March 2006). By extending the applicant's detention by means of collective detention orders the domestic authorities had no proper regard to his individual circumstances.
95. Lastly, the Court notes that the domestic authorities explicitly refused to consider whether the length of the applicant's detention had e
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