departure from the rule of respect for individual liberty and set them out in their decisions dismissing the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the true facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Labita v. Italy [GC], No. 26772/95, § 152, ECHR 2000-IV).
86. The arguments for and against release must not be "general and abstract" (see Smirnova v. Russia, Nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 63, ECHR 2003-IX). Where the law provides for a presumption in respect of factors relevant to the grounds for continued detention, the existence of the concrete facts outweighing the rule of respect for individual liberty must be convincingly demonstrated (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, § 84 in fine, 26 July 2001).
87. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (Labita, cited above, § 153).
(b) Application of the general principles to the present case
88. Having regard to its finding in paragraphs 82 and 83 above and taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the period to be examined commenced on 6 March 2000 when the applicant was re-arrested and ended on 24 December 2003.
89. The Court notes that the authorities extended the applicant's detention on a number of occasions. In their decisions they relied on the gravity of the charges as the main factor and on the applicant's potential to abscond, reoffend or pervert the course of justice.
90. As regards the authorities' reliance on the gravity of the charges as the decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that the gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention (see Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral, cited above, § 68; and Ilijkov, cited above, § 81). This is particularly true in the Russian legal system, where the characterisation in law of the facts - and thus the sentence faced by the applicant - is determined by the prosecution without judicial review of whether the evidence obtained supports a reasonable suspicion that the applicant has committed the alleged offence (see Khudoyorov, cited above, § 180).
91. The other grounds for the applicant's continued detention were the authorities' findings that the applicant could abscond, pervert the course of justice or reoffend. The Court reiterates that it is incumbent on the domestic authorities to establish the existence of concrete facts relevant to the grounds for continued detention. Shifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined cases (see Rokhlina v. Russia, No. 54071/00, § 67, 7 April 2005). It remains to be ascertained whether the domestic authorities established and convincingly demonstrated the existence of concrete facts in support of their conclusions.
92. The Court notes that the domestic authorities gauged the applicant's potential to abscond by reference to the fact that he had been charged with serious criminal offences, thus facing a severe sentence.
> 1 2 3 ... 12 13 14 ... 16 17 18
Zaki.ru законы и право
поиск по сайту
каталог документов
добавить сайт Zaki.ru в избранное
Правовые акты международные
Правовые акты Российской Федерации
