the orders extending his detention after 24 December 2003 (see paragraph 34 above).
63. In this connection, the Court reiterates that the applicant was represented, from the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, by counsel of his own choosing. No explanation has been offered for the counsel's failure to lodge, or advise the applicant to lodge, a judicial appeal against the detention orders. The Court therefore considers that the part of the applicant's complaint concerning the detention after 24 December 2003 must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Belov v. Russia, No. 22053/02, §74, 3 July 2008, and Matyush v. Russia, No. 14850/03, § 63, 9 December 2008).
(c) Conclusion
64. The Court finally observes that, having applied the six-month and exhaustion rules, it has competence to examine the applicant's complaint related to the period of his detention from 24 September to 24 December 2003. The Court notes that that complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
2. Merits
(a) General principles
65. The Court reiterates that the expressions "lawful" and "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" in Article 5 § 1 essentially refer back to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. However, the "lawfulness" of detention under domestic law is not always the decisive element. The Court must in addition be satisfied that detention during the period under consideration was compatible with the purpose of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which is to prevent persons from being deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary fashion.
66. The Court must moreover ascertain whether domestic law itself is in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied therein. On this last point, the Court stresses that, where deprivation of liberty is concerned, it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person - if need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see {Jecius} v. Lithuania, No. 34578/97, § 56, ECHR 2000-IX, and Baranowski v. Poland, No. 28358/95, §§ 50 - 52, ECHR 2000-III).
(b) Application of the general principles to the present case
i. The applicant's detention from 24 to 25 September 2003
67. The Court notes that on 24 June 2003 the Supreme Court of the Tyva Republic, relying on the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that the applicant would pervert the course of justice, extended his detention for an additional three months, until 24 September 2003. However, it was not until 25 September 2003 that the Supreme Court of the Tyva Republic authorised an extension of the applicant's detention, noting that the extension was granted for three months, that is from 24 September to 24 December 2003.
68. The Court has to ascertain whether the detention from 24 to 25 September was "lawful". The Government maintained that the detention was lawful because it complied with the substantive and procedural provisions of the rules of criminal procedure. The applicant alleged that his detention from 24 September 2003, when the order of 23 June 2003 expired, to 25 September 2005, when the Supreme Court granted a further exte
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