Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 18.06.2009 «Дело Рысев (Rysev) против России» [англ.]

d, involved several parties and required experts' reports. It also notes that the applicant amended his claims on several occasions. While the Court considers that these factors rendered more difficult the task of the domestic courts, it cannot accept that the complexity of the case, taken on its own, was such as to justify the overall length of proceedings.
30. As to the applicant's conduct, the Court is not convinced by the Government's argument that the applicant should be held responsible for amending his claims, lodging motions, requesting expert opinions and lodging appeals. It has been the Court's constant approach that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by the national law in the defence of his interests (see, mutatis mutandis, {Yagci} and {Sargin} v. Turkey, 8 June 1995, § 66, Series A No. 319-A). Furthermore, the Government claimed that the parties had failed to appear at some hearings. The Court considers that the domestic courts should have taken measures to discipline the defendants for their repeated failure to appear. In so far as the applicant is concerned, the Government did not indicate any dates on which the applicant had failed to appear. It is true that between 29 April and 8 October 2004 the case was adjourned because the applicant's representative did not appear. However, even if the applicant may be held responsible for the delay due to the failure of his counsel to appear, the Court considers that the applicant cannot be held accountable for any other substantial delays in the proceedings.
31. As regards the conduct of the judicial authorities, the Court notes the Government's argument that during the period under consideration the domestic authorities examined the case twice at two levels. The Court observes in this respect that the need for the second round of proceedings was attributable to the District Court's failure to properly establish important circumstances of the case and to duly assess the evidence. In any event, the fact that the domestic courts heard the case several times did not absolve them from complying with the reasonable time requirement of Article 6 § 1 (see Litoselitis v. Greece, No. 62771/00, § 32, 5 February 2004).
32. The Court further observes that from 10 June until 24 November 1998 no hearings were scheduled because the judge was involved in unrelated proceedings. Furthermore, between 24 August 2000 and 15 March 2001 and between 21 June and 10 August 2001 no proceedings took place because the judge was on sick leave. The accumulated delay amounted to more than a year. The Court further notes that a considerable delay occurred when the case was reassigned to judge K., who took the case over on 16 August 2002 and scheduled the case only for 16 January 2003. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is for Contracting States to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can guarantee the right of everyone to obtain a final decision within a reasonable time (see, for instance, {Loffler} v. Austria, No. 30546/96, § 21, 3 October 2000). The manner in which a State provides for mechanisms to comply with this requirement - whether by increasing the numbers of judges, or by automatic time-limits and directions, or by some other method - is for the State to decide. If a State lets proceedings continue beyond the "reasonable time" prescribed by Article 6 of the Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be responsible for the resultant delay (see Price and Lowe v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 43185/98 and 43186/98, § 23, 29 July 2003). The Court finds that in the present case the authorities did not take due measures to speed up the proceedings and, therefore, the delays resulting from the judge's absence from the hearings and reassignment of the case to different judges are imputable to the State.
33. The Court further not



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