es that the proceedings were suspended for more than a year pending the expert examination ordered on 15 February 2005. That expert study had to establish the impact of the construction work on the state of health of the applicant and his daughters. However, such a term of examination appears quite long. In this respect, the Court reiterates that the principle responsibility for the delay due to the expert opinions rests ultimately with the State. It was incumbent on the domestic court to ensure that the expert examination was performed without delay (see, for example, Rolgezer and Others v. Russia, No. 9941/03, § 30, 29 April 2008; Volovich v. Russia, No. 10374/02, § 30, 5 October 2006; and Capuano v. Italy, 25 June 1987, § 32, Series A No. 119). However, the Government did not provide any information to show that the first-instance court had inquired into the progress of the expert report.
34. In sum, the Court considers that the most significant delays in the proceedings are attributable to the domestic courts.
35. In the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law, and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the "reasonable time" requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention
36. The applicant made several complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He firstly complained that the construction work carried out on his plot of land had resulted in de facto expropriation of part of the land for which he had not received any compensation. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with the general rules of international law, the provisions of the Convention do not bind a Contracting Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with respect to that Party (see {Blecic} v. Croatia [GC], No. 59532/00, § 70, ECHR 2006-...). Furthermore, the Court's temporal jurisdiction is to be determined in relation to the facts constitutive of the alleged interference. The subsequent failure of remedies aimed at redressing that interference cannot bring it within the Court's temporal jurisdiction (see {Blecic}, cited above, § 77). In the present case the alleged interference (construction work) with the applicant's house and land took place between 1989 and 1996, i.e. before the ratification of the Convention by Russia. The proceedings by which the applicant challenged the interference and which ended on 7 December 2006, i.e. after the ratification, did not constitute a new or independent interference with the applicant's property rights, but were aimed at providing him with redress for the interference that had occurred between 1989 and 1996. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione temporis with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
37. The applicant further complained about the authorities' failure to resettle him in a different place. The Court observes that the applicant challenged the authorities' failure to provide him with accommodation in two separate actions and the final decisions were taken on 3 July and 18 October 2001 respectively, whereas the application was lodged on 15 December 2002. It follows that this complaint has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
38. Lastly, the applicant complained that he could not repair his house because the authorities intended to demolish it and that he could not sell his house and land either because of the authorities' refusal to authorise the prospect
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