al basis for such activities and the corresponding practice are in full compliance with the relevant judgments..."
THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention as regards the principle of equality of arms
18. The applicant complained that the principle of equality of arms in the civil proceedings had been infringed as the prosecutor had brought the proceedings in the interest of a State institution and a private person. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair... hearing... by [a]... tribunal..."
A. Admissibility
19. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
20. The applicant contended that the prosecutor's right to institute civil proceedings should have been exercised only if the person concerned was unable to do so herself, for instance in view of her state of health, age, mental condition or another valid reason. Neither reason was present in the instant case. The first plaintiff was a wealthy State-owned institution. The prosecutor's rights were wider than those of an ordinary plaintiff and his or her objectivity was open to doubt. The prosecutor was the first to plead before the court and had an opportunity to address the court before the closure of the proceedings.
21. The Government submitted that the prosecutor's decision to initiate civil proceedings had been based on Article 41 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 11 above) and his obligation to protect the interests of the State and its nationals, namely the interests of the persons awaiting housing. The prosecutor's interest in the proceedings was of a procedural nature; he acted in his own right but also in the defence of other persons' rights.
22. The Court reiterates that the principle of equality of arms is one element of the broader concept of fair trial, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It requires "a fair balance between the parties", each party must be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage {vis-a-vis} his opponent (see Yvon v. France, No. 44962/98, § 31, ECHR 2003-V; {Niderost-Huber} v. Switzerland, 18 February 1997, § 23, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I; and Kress v. France [GC], No. 39594/98, § 72, ECHR 2001-VI).
23. Referring to its previous case-law on the role of public prosecutors outside the criminal law field, the Court reiterates that in a number of cases it has clarified that the mere presence of the prosecutor or comparable officer at the courts' deliberations, be it "active" or "passive", is deemed to be a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Martinie v. France [GC], No. 58675/00, § 53, ECHR 2006-...). In other cases the Court has also examined whether the submissions of the advocate-general or similar officer have been communicated to the applicant/party and whether the parties have had the opportunity to reply to them (see Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 20 February 1996, § 31, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I; K.D.B. v. the Netherlands, 27 March 1998, § 43, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II and {Goc} v. Turkey [GC], No. 36590/97, § 55, ECHR 2002-V).
24. The present case, however, raises different issues, since the prosecutor did not participate in the judicial deliberations; his lawsuit was communicated to the applicant and she used the opportunity given to her to reply to the prosecutor's arguments. Nevertheless, the Cour
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