had shown a lack of respect for her private life. It is unclear what other evidence she could present, also given that she and A. had concealed their relationship.
(b) The Government
24. The Government stated that the blood sampling for the DNA test in the present case had been carried out by the Astrakhan Regional Health Department with an essential breach of the Instruction on organisation and production of expert examinations in Bureaus of forensic medical examinations. Blood sampling was conducted on 10 February 2004 in the presence of the parties, their lawyers and four medical workers, including a person who took the samples. However, there were only two signatures on the envelopes with the samples instead of the three required; furthermore, these signatures were not decoded as there were no names or positions next to them.
25. The Government claimed that inappropriate blood sampling which led to the DNA test being declared inadmissible did not amount to an interference with the applicant's right guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. Under Article 87 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court could order a second test if it doubted the accuracy of the previous one; however the applicant had failed to request a new test.
26. Furthermore, under civil procedural law a plaintiff had to substantiate his or her claim; yet the applicant had neither called witnesses nor presented any other reliable evidence to prove that her child was A.'s daughter or that she had had an intimate relationship with A., whilst in the course of the proceedings it had been proved that A. had a wife and two children and had never lived together with the applicant as a family. The Government thus saw no violation of the applicant's rights guaranteed by Article 8.
2. The Court's assessment
(a) Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention
27. The Court reiterates that "private life" is a broad term encompassing, inter alia, aspects of an individual's physical and social identity including the right to personal autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007-...).
28. The Court has previously examined cases in which a man wished to institute proceedings to contest his paternity of a child born in wedlock or, alternatively, to have his putative biological paternity recognised. In those cases the Court noted that the determination of the father's legal relations with his putative child concerned his "private life" (see Shofman v. Russia, No. 74826/01, § 30, 24 November 2005; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), No. 34308/96, 19 October 1999; Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 November 1984, § 33, Series A No. 87; and {Rozanski} v. Poland, No. 55339/00, § 62, 18 May 2006). In a number of cases the Court has also held that a right to respect for private life includes a right of a child born out of wedlock to determine the legal relationship between him or her and his or her natural father (see {Mikulic} v. Croatia, No. 53176/99, § 53, ECHR 2002-I, and {Jaggi} v. Switzerland, No. 58757/00, §§ 25 - 26, ECHR 2006-...).
29. The present application is, however, different. The applicant, a mother of a child born out of wedlock, complained of a violation of her own right guaranteed by Article 8. Thus, a core of the present case is the applicant's ability to obtain recognition of A. as the biological father of her daughter. In the Court's view, establishment of paternity of the applicant's daughter is a matter related to the "private life" of the applicant, who bears full responsibility for her minor child. Recognition of the natural father, apart from its financial and emotional purposes, may also be important from the point of view of the applicant's social image, her family medic
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