Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 23.04.2009 «Дело Губкин (Gubkin) против России» [англ.]

licant's detention had been the gravity of the charges that he had been facing.

B. The Court's assessment

1. Admissibility

130. The Court first reiterates that, in determining the length of detention pending trial under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see Panchenko v. Russia, No. 45100/98, § 91, 8 February 2005; Klyakhin v. Russia, No. 46082/99, § 57, 30 November 2004; and Labita, cited above, §§ 145 and 147).
131. Furthermore, the Court observes that, in view of the essential link between Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as being detained "for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence", as specified in the latter provision, but is in the position provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty "after conviction by a competent court" (see Panchenko, cited above, § 93, and {Kudla}, cited above, § 104).
132. Accordingly, in the present case the period to be taken into consideration consisted of four separate terms: (1) from 10 June 1998 when the applicant was arrested to his conviction under Article 228 § 1 of the Criminal Code on 10 January 1999; (2) from 24 March 1999 when the prosecution again brought against the applicant the charges under Articles 126 § 2, 139 § 1, and 163 § 3 of the Criminal Code until his conviction on 13 June 2000; (3) from 2 November 2000 when the applicant's conviction was quashed on appeal until his subsequent conviction on 14 May 2001; and (4) from 16 January 2002 when the above conviction was quashed on appeal until his subsequent conviction on 17 May 2004.
133. The Court does not lose sight of the fact that during part of the second term the applicant was concurrently serving his sentence after conviction in an unrelated criminal case (see paragraph 12 above). However, the applicability of one ground listed in Article 5 § 1 does not necessarily preclude the applicability of another and detention may be justified under more than one sub-paragraph of that provision (see Brand v. the Netherlands, No. 49902/99, § 58, 11 May 2004, and Johnson v. the United Kingdom, 24 October 1997, § 58, Reports 1997-VII; and, more specifically, Eriksen v. Norway, 27 May 1997, § 92, Reports 1997-III). The Court finds, therefore, that in the present case the period when the applicant was concurrently serving his sentence was justified under both subparagraphs (a) and (c) of Article 5 § 1, and that the whole period from 24 March 1999 to 13 June 2000 should be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 5 § 3.
134. The Court considers further that, in the instant case, the multiple, consecutive detention periods should be regarded as a whole, and the six-month period should only start to run from the end of the last period of pre-trial custody, that is from 17 May 2004 (see, as recent authorities, Mishketkul and Others v. Russia, No. 36911/02, § 40, 24 May 2007, and Solmaz v. Turkey, No. 27561/02, §§ 34 - 37, 16 January 2007).
135. Making an overall evaluation of the accumulated periods under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the Court therefore concludes that the period to be taken into consideration in the instant case is four years and eight months.
136. The Court notes that the present complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

2. Merits

137. The Court reiterates that the persistence of reasonable suspicion that the pe



> 1 2 3 ... 17 18 19 ... 24 25 26

	Поделиться:	Tweet