Постановление Европейского суда по правам человека от 23.04.2009 «Дело Губкин (Gubkin) против России» [англ.]

rson arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention. However after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings (see Labita, cited above, §§ 152 and 153).
138. The presumption is in favour of release. As the Court has consistently held, the second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until his conviction, the accused must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable (see, among other authorities, Castravet v. Moldova, No. 23393/05, § 30, 13 March 2007; McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], No. 543/03, § 41, ECHR 2006-...; Jablonski v. Poland, No. 33492/96, § 83, 21 December 2000; and Neumeister v. Austria, 27 June 1968, § 4, Series A No. 8).
139. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant was arrested on 10 June 1998 and was held in custody until his conviction on 17 May 2004, as upheld on appeal on 10 March 2005. The period under consideration lasted four years and eight months (see paragraphs 132 - 135 above).
140. The Court accepts that the applicant's detention may initially have been warranted by a reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the commission of several criminal offences. However, after a certain lapse of time the persistence of a reasonable suspicion, in itself, no longer sufficed. Accordingly, the domestic authorities were under an obligation to analyse the applicant's personal situation in greater detail and to give specific reasons for holding him in custody.
141. The Court observes that in the period from March 2000 to July 2002 the domestic court maintained the applicant in detention without citing any particular reason. Subsequently, in the period from July 2002 to May 2004 the court extended the applicant's detention on eight occasions. The only ground invoked for continuing the applicant's detention was the fact that he was charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences whose dangerousness alone was considered a sufficient reason for holding him in custody (see, in particular, paragraphs 21, 23 and 25 above). Each time the court used the same summary formula to extend the pre-trial detention of five persons, without describing their personal situation in any detail.
142. As regards the domestic authorities' reliance on the gravity of the charges as the sole and decisive element, the Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into consideration only the gravity of the offence. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Belevitskiy v. Russia, No. 72967/01, § 101, 1 March 2007; Panchenko, cited above, § 102; Khudoyorov, cited above, § 180; and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, No. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001).
143. In the present case the domestic courts refused to take into account any specific facts put forward by the applicant in his appeals against extensions and applications for release (see, for instance, paragraph 25 above). The courts assumed that the gravity of the charges carried such a preponderant weight that no other circumst



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